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Abstract. In the `glass ceiling' debate there appear to be two
strongly held and opposing interpretations of the evidence, one sug-
gesting it is really the result of gender di®erences and the other that
there is discrimination by gender. This paper provides an economic
theory of the glass ceiling and one of the main insights of our anal-
ysis is that in some real sense these two interpretations are not in
con°ict with each other. The glass ceiling emerges as an equilibrium
phenomenon when ¯rms compete µ a la Bertrand even though employers
know that o®ering women the same contract as men would be su±-
cient to erase all di®erences among promoted workers. The model also
provides new insights into anti-discrimination policy measures. (JEL
Codes: J16, D82)
Keywords: Glass ceiling, promotions, career options.
1. Introduction
The glass ceiling is one of the most controversial and emotive aspects of em-
ployment in organizations. The term appears to have originated only in the
mid 1980s but became so rapidly sealed in the lexicon that by 1991 the US
had created a Federal Glass Ceiling Commission with the Secretary of Labor
as its chair. When setting up the Glass Ceiling Commission in 1991 the US
Department of Labor de¯ned the concept as \those arti¯cial barriers based
on attitudinal or organizational bias that prevent quali¯ed individuals from
advancing upward in their organizations into management-level positions". It
added that these barriers re°ect \discrimination ... a deep line of demarcation
between those who prosper and those who are left behind." One only has to
look at the casual empirical evidence to see why the issue remains topical and
heated.
Women form a disproportionately small group in senior management posi-
tions. For example, Figure 1 provides the proportion of females in employment
¤We thank Dan Bernhardt, Martin Cripps, Spyros Dendrinos, Bart Lipman, Martin Hell-
wig, Ian Jewitt, Glenn Loury and Andy McLennan for useful conversations and comments.
We also thank seminar participants at Boston, Brown, Korea and Kyoto Universities and
the Universities of Bonn, Bristol, SUNY at Albany, and Queensland, and the ESEM 2008
in Milan. Any remaining errors are our own. The authors thank the Leverhulme Trust for
funding this research project. (Emails: p.a.grout@, i.park@, s.sonderegger@bristol.ac.uk)
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amongst US professions and the proportion of female within those employ-
ees working as o±cials and managers (US Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission). Women constitute just over half of all professions but little
more than a third of all o±cials and managers. In the US Fortune 500 women
account for only 15.6% of all corporate o±cer positions of any type. Further-
more, not only do women form a minority of employees at senior levels, they
also receive lower remuneration than men. This disparity is re°ected through-
out senior management. Figure 2 shows the relative salary of educated women
(according to highest education attainment) to equivalent educated men in
the US from 1990 to date. The ratio for both women with bachelors de-
gree and those with an advanced quali¯cation (i.e., higher than bachelors) are
relatively constant and very similar, with mean values below 0.6 across the
period.
In the current debate, and to a lesser extent in the academic literature,
there appear to be two strongly held and opposing interpretations of all this
evidence. One interpretation is that this is the result of real gender di®erences.
The other interpretation is that what is observed is only consistent with dis-
crimination by gender. This paper provides an economic theory of the glass
ceiling. One of the main insights emerging from our analysis is that in some
real sense these two views are not in con°ict with each other. A critical as-
sumption of the model is that there is more diversity in women with regard
to job commitment than men1 (we discuss this later in this section) who, as
a result, have less potential for private information. In this sense, consistent
with the ¯rst interpretation, gender di®erences are at the heart of the story.
However, in our model, employers know that if female workers were o®ered
the same promotion contracts as men, all promoted women would display the
same job commitment as men, and so this private information would become
irrelevant. Thus, if any di®erence persists between male and female promotion
contracts in equilibrium nonetheless, it cannot be justi¯ed by invoking di®er-
ences in the two genders' propensity to leave their high-rank jobs. In spite of
this, we show that in equilibrium ¯rms choose to o®er promotion contracts
that di®er between the two genders, even when they compete µ a la Bertrand
for employees. So, in a real sense the second interpretation is also correct.
The model allows us to understand the ways in which the discrimination in-
terpretation is correct and gives insight into the design of anti-discrimination
policies.
There are papers that ¯nd pure gender discrimination. Goldin and Rouse
1This is backed for instance by recent evidence by Bertrand, Goldin and Katz (2009),
who have tracked the careers of MBAs who graduated between 1990 and 2006 from a top
U.S. business school. They show that the presence of children is the main contributor to
greater career discontinuity and shorter work hours for female MBAs relative to their male
counterparts.An Economic Theory of Glass Ceiling 3
(2000) look at the e®ect of symphony orchestras choosing to use \blind" audi-
tions that conceal the musician. They ¯nd blind auditions increase the prob-
ability that women are hired. Similarly, Neumark et al (1996), using matched
groups of men and women, ¯nd evidence of gender discrimination in hiring
in restaurants. On the other hand, there is also a considerable literature on
gender di®erences and associated economic disparities both within economics
and from outside the discipline. For example, Babcock and Laschever (2003)
argue that women are poor negotiators and generally dislike the process of
negotiating. Browne (1995, 1998) suggests that men are more interested in
striving for status in hierarchies and \engage in risk taking behavior that is of-
ten necessary to reach the top of hierarchies." Kanazawa (2005) uses General
Social Survey data to show that men rank ¯nancial reward and power posi-
tions much higher in their preferences for employment, concluding that since
men covet and strive for such positions they are the ones who are more likely
to succeed in achieving them, whereas \women have better things to do."
Some recent economic experiments are related to this literature. Gneezy et al
(2003) ¯nd that men perform signi¯cantly better than women in a more com-
petitive, tournament environment, while there is no gap in a non-competitive,
piece rate environment. When subjects can choose between a piece rate and
a tournament environment, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) ¯nd a signi¯cant
gender gap in choice, with 35% of women and 73% of men selecting the tour-
nament. Fryer et al (2008) report that the introduction of ¯nancial incentives
(as opposed to increased competition) exacerbates the gender gap by enhanc-
ing the performance of men signi¯cantly, while it increases the stress levels of
women more than men, in their experiment.
Economists have studied di®erential treatments in labor market from the
perspectives of discrimination theories, pioneered by Becker (1959), Arrow
(1973) and Phelps (1977), and further developed by other authors, e.g., Coate
and Loury (1993). The current paper, however, explains the glass ceiling
as a competitive equilibrium outcome of agents dealing with informational
problems. Hence, our approach is more closely related to Lazear and Rosen
(1990) who study gender di®erential treatment by non-discriminating employ-
ers. Similar to them, we study an environment where women have non-market
opportunities that are on average better than those for men. There are, how-
ever, important di®erences. In Lazear and Rosen, the fact that women face
worse promotion prospects than men is somewhat \justi¯ed" since promoted
women do have on average a higher propensity to leave or take a career break
than men. By contrast, in our approach ¯rms know that they can o®er con-
tracts that would remove such gender di®erential conditional on promotion.
Speci¯cally, in our equilibrium the promotion o®er made to men would domi-
nate the non-market option for all promoted women, rendering them identical
to promoted men because they would never leave. This implies that there isAn Economic Theory of Glass Ceiling 4
no a priori reason why women should be made promotion o®ers di®erently
from men. Nonetheless, we show that women are consistently o®ered inferior
promotion deals than men, earning a lower wage in high-rank jobs. This dif-
ferential treatment is \unjusti¯ed" since promoted women are no worse than
men in productivity. Relative to Lazear and Rosen, our model shows that the
glass ceiling may emerge as an equilibrium phenomenon of the labor market
competition, even though it is not grounded in productivity di®erences.
The formal model we consider is loosely as follows. There are two tech-
nologically identical ¯rms competing for employees.2 Employees are hired to
entry-level positions and each ¯rm has need for one senior management slot for
every two entry-level positions. The amount of e®ort (human capital invest-
ment) that employees put in at entry-level positions a®ects their productivity
in senior-level posts if they get promoted, but has no impact on their output
in the second period otherwise.
The ¯rms compete µ a la Bertrand in the labor market at an initial hiring
stage by o®ering contracts that specify their terms of promotion. We analyze
what happens when contracts can be made gender speci¯c with a view to
understanding the impact on the equilibrium when various possible legal anti-
discrimination restrictions are placed on the market. Employees approach the
¯rm that o®ers the best contract for them, and then take up the other o®er
if they are not chosen by that ¯rm.
Firms select their senior level managers from the intake at the lower level
in the previous period based on the e®ort levels they exerted and the contracts
o®ered. Since we assume that these e®ort levels are not observable by the rival
¯rm, promotions take place internally within the ¯rm in equilibrium. Ex-post
negotiations are allowed between a ¯rm and workers promoted in the rival
¯rm, but it does not happen in equilibrium for it would necessitate reneging
on a contract with some other worker. Note that even if the e®ort levels were
observable by rival ¯rms, there are good reasons why ex-post negotiations may
not matter. For instance, it would be so if we introduced a small ¯rm-speci¯c
element in human capital investment into the model.
We assume that women di®er in terms of the non-market options available
to them. Whether these options are worthwhile to pursue when they arise,
however, is endogenously determined. The equilibrium has two main features.
The ¯rst is that promoted women end up being paid less than men, even
though they are equally productive. This is a striking results since, as dis-
cussed above, this di®erential treatment cannot be justi¯ed by invoking gender
di®erences in productivity. Employers know that o®ering the male promotion
contract to female workers would be su±cient to erase all gender di®erences
2We think of the two ¯rm market being sustained by entry costs that limit the number
of ¯rms that can be accommodated in the market.An Economic Theory of Glass Ceiling 5
among promoted workers. Hence, in our model, the di®erences in the promo-
tion o®ers made to male and females do not stem from productivity di®erences,
but from other forces.
The second feature is that the di®erential treatment su®ered by women
in their promotion deals persists even when ¯rms compete Bertrand-style for
employees. Moreover, we show that even though ¯rms are ex-ante identical
and follow the same strategy, the equilibrim is asymmetric ex-post, in the
sense that one ¯rm is more female friendly than the other. Hence, in equilib-
rium one ¯rm will employ more women3 and extract a smaller surplus from
them than the other ¯rm.
What is the basic intuition why, even in the presence of Bertrand compe-
tition, promoted women do not receive full reward for their e®ort? It starts
from the observation that the option available for the workers who forgo pro-
motion is worse for women than men due to the competitive labor market,
because the compensation fully re°ects the gender di®erences in commitment
for those workers. This means that women with low non-market options are
willing to accept worse promotion deals than men, since their market alter-
natives are worse than those of men. Hence, a ¯rm can, at least initially,
promote women more \cheaply" than men. But, promoting more women is
gradually more costly, since it requires inducing women with better and bet-
ter non-market alternatives to apply for promotion, and therefore it requires
the promotion deals o®ered to women to become gradually more attractive.
Bertrand competition raises ¯rms' bids for women workers and reduces the ex-
tra surplus that promoted women generate. However, this competition stops
short of erasing the extra surplus completely, because at some point it pays for
a ¯rm to abandon the bidding war and instead, extract the maximum surplus
from the residual women workforce.4 This also explains why one ¯rm is more
female friendly than the other in equilibrium.
Thus the model provides an explanation for the glass ceiling phenomenon
that, although not grounded in real productivity di®erences between men and
women in high-rank posts, is the outcome of a competitive process. We are
able to show that this equilibrium does not depend on being able to o®er
gender speci¯c contracts. However, if promotion rules (such as minimum
promotion ratios for women) are imposed on the organization, then the equi-
3It is worth noting that separation of black and white workers is taking place between
¯rms in Lang, Manove and Dickens (2005). However, their model is one of monopolistic
competition in labor market without human capital investment and promotion decisions
and thus, their focus and analysis are di®erent from ours.
4Astute readers will have notice that this is not a full description of the equilibrium in
a simultaneous move game because if one ¯rm abandons the bidding war, the other ¯rm's
bid would not be optimal. For this reason, ¯rms use a mixed strategy in equilibrium. In
addition, see the discussion following Theorem 2 in Section 4.An Economic Theory of Glass Ceiling 6
librium can change to improve the position of those women who have a low
propensity for career breaks. A central feature of our approach that separates
our conclusions from other discrimination models is that these restrictions
cannot be temporary incursions into the labor market to shift the equilibrium
to a more favorable one in a multi-equilibrium environment.5 In our model,
the interventions would have to be \permanent."
However, we also show that there are signi¯cant di®erences between pro-
motion rules, in particular, between rules that set lower bounds on the fraction
of women to be promoted and rules on the fraction of senior posts that must
be ¯lled by women. In the former it is necessary to choose exactly the right
bound (which is a measure zero event) to eliminate the glass ceiling problem,
but in the latter setting any bound in an interval will do.
Before moving to the main body of the paper it is useful to highlight the
potential applicability of the model. Although we have focused on gender, we
see the model as being relevant for other observationally distinct groups as
well. An immediate broad analogy is the treatment of immigrant employees
(particularly where the culture of the country they have left is very di®erent
from the host country), since these foreign employees may wish to return to
their home country at some point.6
The next section describes how we model the environment as a game.
Section 3 analyzes the game when there is a monopoly employer, which is
extended in Section 4 to characterize the unique equilibrium outcome under
Bertrand competition between employers. Section 5 addresses policy implica-
tions. Section 6 contains some concluding remarks.
2. Model
We consider a labor market with two populations of workers, male and female,
of the same measure 2. There is an initial period of their employment, period
1, during which they decide on human capital investment. Depending on their
investment decision, they may get one of two kinds of jobs in period 2, referred
to as upper-tier and low-tier jobs as explained below. In the middle of period 2
all workers may encounter a non-market option with the same probability p, at
which point separation may occur as detailed below. We assume that female
5Although many models have the feature that a±rmative action only needs to be tem-
porary, this is not always the case (see Coate and Loury (1993)).
6An alternative anecdotal example (encountered by one of the authors) concerns a full
time employee who enjoyed writing novels in his spare time. He claimed that he always
felt disadvantaged relative to his colleagues since it was always implied that he was not
as committed to the career as others because \surely he would really prefer to be a full
time author" and was only waiting for the opportunity. He claimed this question arose to
di®ering degrees of directness at every appraisal he ever had, and that he thus felt obliged
to display greater commitment to the cause than other employees.An Economic Theory of Glass Ceiling 7
workers are heterogenous in the value of their non-market options. Precisely,
each female worker has a private type µ drawn from a commonly known cdf
D(µ) on R+, where µ is the value of her outside, non-market option she may
encounter while on the job. Men are much less varied in this dimension. In
particular, for simplicity, we assume that all male workers are homogeneous
in the sense that the value of their non-market option is zero (i.e., they do
not encounter such options). For expositional ease, we assume that p = 1 and
that µ is uniformly distributed over an interval [0; 1
®], i.e., D(µ) = ®µ, where
® 2 (0;1=4) to ensure that the outside option is signi¯cant for a su±ciently
large fraction of female workers. Our results extend to large enough p < 1
and to a wide class of single-peaked distributions D, but exposition becomes
more complex.
There are two ¯rms, A and B, that are ex ante identical: each ¯rm has
a measure 2 of entry-level positions to ¯ll in period 1, and a measure 1 of
managerial positions, called upper-tier jobs, to ¯ll in period 2. Note that it
is not possible for both ¯rms to hire only female (or only male) workers and,
in particular, female workers are relatively scarce in this sense. This aspect
is important for our results. However, the assumption that the total measure
of the labor force is equal to total vacancies is not essential, and nor is that
the ratio of upper-tier to entry-level posts is 1=2, and therefore, they can be
relaxed but at a cost of expositional complication.
All workers (male and female) are assumed to have the same productivity
in entry-level posts, which we normalize to 0. However, as indicated they
can make a human capital investment/e®ort, e 2 R+ in period 1, that would
increase their productivity in the next period if they get promoted to an
upper-tier post. The worker's cost of making e®ort is quadratic7, c(e) = 1
2e2,
and is incurred in period 1. The exerted e®ort level is observable only by the
¯rm that he/she works for. Female workers learn their private types, µ, early
in period 1, in particular, before their e®ort decisions.
In period 2, workers may get promoted to upper-tier posts. A promoted
worker generates a °ow revenue of y(e) = 1+e for the ¯rm during period 2 (of
length 1), where e is the e®ort exerted in period 1. However, at the midpoint of
period 2, female workers encounter a shock that increases their outside option
value from 0 to µ, in which case they choose whether (i) to remain in the job
and get the contracted wage, or (ii) to leave the job (forfeiting the wage for
the second half of period 2) and get the newly available outside option, which
generates a °ow (monetary equivalent) utility of µ for the remainder of period
2. We assume that if a worker leaves an upper-tier post then no revenue is
generated by that post for the remainder of the period unless the worker is
replaced by another worker who has held an upper-tier job in either ¯rm.
7Our results extend straightforwardly to strictly convex cost functions.An Economic Theory of Glass Ceiling 8
All workers that do not get promoted can get a low-tier job in period 2,
where they generate a constant °ow revenue of 1 + · after retraining which
costs · > 0 for the employer. The interpretation is that these jobs require
\run of the mill" operations that can be carried out by anyone who has worked
in an entry-level position. Since, unlike the upper-tier posts, all workers are
equally productive while on low-tier jobs, competitive employers pay a °ow
wage that leaves them with zero expected pro¯t: wm = 1 for men and wf < 1
for women. Here, wf < 1 re°ects the market's expected loss in revenue due
to the prospect of departure by female workers for the non-market option of
µ (if µ > wf) in the middle of period 2. For ease of exposition, we treat wf as
exogenous, although it can be determined endogenously in equilibrium, taking
into account the types of women who get low-tier jobs, without a®ecting the
main results. We present our analysis for wf 2 (0:9;1) to stress that our
results hold even when wf is arbitrarily close to wm (which is the case when
· is arbitrarily small), but our results extend to a wider range of wf at the
cost of expositional complication.
Given that the competitive wages for low-tier jobs leave zero pro¯t for the
employer, it is inconsequential for our analysis whether such jobs are available
in the ¯rms that hired the workers initially or in a di®erent section of the labor
market. For simplicity, we present our analysis presuming the latter. The
upper-tier posts are di®erent in the sense that each ¯rm has a comparative
advantage of identifying more quali¯ed workers among its own employees.
Therefore, prior to period 1, the two ¯rms compete, µ a la Bertrand, in at-
tracting workers by o®ering more favorable (for the workers) contracts than
their rivals. First, the two ¯rms, i = A;B, publicly and simultaneously an-
nounce their contracts si = (si
f;si
m), consisting of one °ow salary level si
g 2 R+
for each gender g 2 fm;fg to be paid to workers promoted to upper-tier posts
in period 2. We assume that the court enforces that no promoted worker gets
paid less than the contracted salary rate si
g at any point in period 2 while on
the job. Thus, ¯rm i's \contract (o®er) strategy" is represented by a proba-
bility measure F i on R2
+. Note that a contract does not specify a salary in
period 1, which we assume is equal to the productivity, 0. This assumption is
for ease of exposition and, as explained in Section 4, our main results extend
to the case that a contract speci¯es period 1 salary as well.
After the contracts are o®ered, the workers are matched with the ¯rms in
an \allocation" stage. A precise modeling of this process, such as initial appli-
cation and selection procedures and the second matching process of un¯lled
posts and residual labor supply, would involve nontrivial ad hoc assumptions.
Hence, we take an alternative approach of directly postulating workforce al-
location rules based on the fundamental principle that the ¯rm o®ering a
more favorable contract gets the ¯rst pick in hiring decisions. Here alloca-
tions are represented by measures, ¹i
g, of gender g 2 fm;fg workers hired byAn Economic Theory of Glass Ceiling 9
¯rm i 2 fA;Bg, such that ¹i
m + ¹i
f = 2 for i = A;B, and ¹A
g + ¹B
g = 2 for
g = f;m. We denote ¹i = (¹i
m;¹i
f).
If a ¯rm, say i, has o®ered a contract si and hired ¹i = (¹i
m;¹i
f) of workers,
the continuation game has a nonempty set of equilibria (Lemma 6), denoted
by E(si;¹i). Let E(si) = [¹iE(si;¹i) and ¦¤(si) be the maximum of the
¯rm's equilibrium pro¯t levels in E(si).
If ¯rm i were to take the ¯rst pick in hiring, it would hire so as to maximize
its pro¯t in the continuation equilibrium. If there is a unique equilibrium
in E(si) that generates ¦¤(si) and it is the unique continuation equilibrium
following the ¯rm's o®er of si and hiring ¹i of workers, then the ¯rm will
indeed hire ¹i. In this case, the value of contract si is the female worker's ex
ante utility in this equilibrium. Generally, the value of a contract si, denoted
by v(si), is the ex ante expected utility of a female worker in an equilibrium
of E(si) that generates ¦¤(si) for the ¯rm. We stress that v(si) is uniquely
de¯ned in all contracts relevant for our main analysis, and the values of other
contracts are inconsequential. Since all female workers prefer to be hired by
the ¯rm that has o®ered a contract with a higher value, we postulate that
this ¯rm has priority in hiring women as speci¯ed below. Note that v(si)
is de¯ned endogenously to ensure that it correctly re°ects the value female
workers attach to a contract in equilibrium.8
The valuation of male contracts is di®erent due to the homogeneity of
male workers. Since they can guarantee a utility of 1 by exerting no e®ort
and getting a low-tier job in period 2 (i.e., forgoing promotion), the value
of any male contract is at least 1. On the other hand, even if some ¯rm
o®ers a very attractive male salary sm then as long as this ¯rm hires more
than measure 1 of male workers, they would compete for promotion and, as a
result, all promoted male workers end up exerting an e®ort level, say em, that
restores the equivalence of pursuing promotion and not, i.e., sm ¡ e2
m=2 = 1.
So, if either ¯rm hires more than measure 1 of male workers, male workers
know that they will end up obtaining a utility of 1, i.e., no higher than what
they could obtain when they are hired by the other ¯rm. This means that
either ¯rm is at least as well placed as the other ¯rm in hiring additional male
workers up to measure 1.
Based on these observations, we postulate the labor force allocation as9:
(H1) The ¯rm, say A, o®ering a contract with a strictly higher value ¯rst hires
8Alternatively, one could de¯ne the value exogenously albeit ad hoc, e.g., as the level of
female salary o®ered. Our qualitative results remain valid in this alternative de¯nition.
9This allocation would ensue if the actual matching process is, for instance, as follows:
All workers apply to both ¯rms (at no cost) and the ¯rms have one chance of o®ering
positions and the workers choose among the o®ered positions (randomly if equivalent o®ers),
given that the ¯rms have to ¯ll all positions to operate.An Economic Theory of Glass Ceiling 10
as large a fraction of women as it wants, and as large a fraction of men
as it wants up to measure 1. Then, ¯rm B ¯lls all its posts from the
residual labor force. Finally, ¯rm A hires any remaining workers.
(H2) If the two ¯rms o®er contracts of the same value, they are allocated
measure 1 of each gender. Then, either ¯rm may propose an alternative
allocation, which is implemented if accepted by the other ¯rm.
A strategy of each ¯rm in an allocation stage, given the o®ered contracts
fsA;sBg, is a hiring decision as per the rule (H1) if v(sA) 6= v(sB), and a
decision as to which alternative allocation to propose and/or to accept as per
(H2) if v(sA) = v(sB).
If v(si) > v(sj) we describe ¯rm i as a leader (in hiring) and j as a follower.
Note that this is a slight abuse of terminology since, unlike the Stackelberg
setting, the identities of ¯rms are endogenous.
After contracts si are o®ered and workforce is allocated as ¹i for i = A;B,
a \promotion subgame" ensues, comprising periods 1 and 2. During these
periods ¯rms cannot ¯re workers, however workers may leave the ¯rm at any
time, forgoing any unpaid °ow salary. At the beginning of period 1 all female
workers learn their private types µ, and every worker in either ¯rm exerts an
e®ort level e 2 R+, which is observable only by the employer. In period 2,
each ¯rm decides who to promote based on gender and exerted e®ort level,
and pays them the salaries speci¯ed in the relevant contracts. All unpromoted
workers leave the ¯rm and get a low-tier job that pays a °ow wage of wg.
After the ¯rm has completed promotion decisions, we assume that any
unpromoted worker may sue his/her employer. There is a case for a court to
consider provided that he/she is potentially valuable for the ¯rm to promote
in the sense that 1 + e ¡ si
g ¸ 0 where e is the exerted level of e®ort and g is
the gender of the worker. If the court veri¯es either
(Ci) that the ¯rm promoted some worker who has exerted a strictly lower
level of e®ort than the plainti®, or
(Cii) that a non-zero measure of upper-tier posts are unoccupied,10
then the court ¯nds in favor of the plainti® and a hefty compensation payment
must be made by the ¯rm to the plainti®. We assume a su±ciently high
veri¯ability of e®ort levels in the court so that ¯rms never leave any scope for
a worker to successfully sue the ¯rm.11
We note that veri¯ability of e®ort, which permits court protection pos-
tulated above, is instrumental in obtaining uniqueness of equilibrium in our
10(Cii) is not necessary for our main result, but simpli¯es exposition considerably.
11Note that we are implicitly setting the cost of going to a court at zero, however, our
results would continue to hold when the cost is positive unless it were prohibitively large.An Economic Theory of Glass Ceiling 11
model, but not essential for the glass ceiling phenomenon. That is, our equi-
librium (which exhibits a glass ceiling) continues to be an equilibrium, albeit
no longer the unique one, even if e®ort is unveri¯able (see Section 4).
At the midpoint of period 2, female workers encounter a non-market option
of value µ, in which case they may leave the job to get µ. Here, we assume that
when an employee is attracted to a non-market option that is more valuable
than the current employment, departure is irreversible and renegotiation of
salary is irrelevant at that point. A positive measure of such departures
causes damage to the ¯rm. For expositional ease, we capture such damage by
simply postulating that the posts vacated by departures cannot be replaced.
However, alternative modeling of what may happen to the vacated posts would
not change our main results so long as the damage in°icted to the ¯rm is
nontrivial.12
In a promotion subgame of ¯rm i with contract si and allocation ¹i, each
worker's strategy consists of an e®ort level,13 decision as to whether to sue the
¯rm or not in the relevant contingencies, and for female workers, the decisions
as to whether to leave employment for the non-market option of value µ; and
¯rm i's strategy speci¯es who to promote based on gender and exerted e®ort
level (contingent on the pro¯le of e®orts exerted by all workers). Each worker
maximizes the expected value of his/her income stream, including that from
the non-market option and compensation from a lawsuit, net of any e®ort
cost. Each ¯rm maximizes its expected pro¯t, i.e., total revenue net of total
salary and lawsuit-compensation payments. We assume no discounting for
simplicity.
A strategy pro¯le in this promotion subgame, together with a belief pro-
¯le on the type distribution of female workers contingent on the exerted e®ort
level, constitutes a (perfect Bayesian) continuation equilibrium of this sub-
game if the strategies are mutual best-responses and the belief pro¯le satis¯es
Bayes rule whenever possible.
A strategy pro¯le of the two ¯rms in o®ering contracts, a strategy pro-
¯le of the two ¯rms in the allocation stage for each possible set of o®ered
12For example, the ¯rms may try to ¯ll vacated posts by recruiting workers in upper-tier
posts of the other ¯rm by o®ering a higher salary. Then, a positive measure of departures
in either ¯rm would inevitably launch a recruiting war between the two ¯rms, pushing
the salaries of all upper-tier post workers up to their productivities (which the other ¯rm
can infer correctly in equilibrium), thereby depleting any positive pro¯t of the ¯rm for the
remainder of period 2. Foreseeing this, the ¯rms avoid hiring that would lead to departures
and consequently, the equilibrium outcome is the same as in our model.
13Precisely, male workers' e®ort choice is represented by a probability measure »m on
R+ and female workers' e®ort choice by a probability measure »f on R+ £ [0;1=®] where
[0;1=®] is the type space. Each »g may be interpreted either as the common mixed strategy
adopted by all workers of gender g 2 ff;mg, or the distribution of pure strategies adopted
by measure ¹i
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contracts fsigi=A;B, and a pro¯le of continuation equilibria for every possible
promotion subgame, constitute an equilibrium of the grand game if, given the
pro¯le of continuation equilibria, i) the strategy pro¯le in the allocation stage
contingent on fsigi is an equilibrium in the continuation game, and ii) the
contract strategies of the two ¯rms are mutual best-responses given the rest
of strategies.
An equilibrium outcome of the game consists of a pair of (possibly stochas-
tic) contracts fsigi, allocations f¹igi contingent on fsigi, and the ensuing
e®ort pro¯le of the workers and the promotion decisions, that arise in an
equilibrium. We characterize the equilibrium outcome in the next two sec-
tions.
3. Analysis of a Monopoly Firm
We start by analyzing the case where ¯rm i is the only employer, because
many of the core insights in this simpler environment carry over to the case of
Bertrand competition. Then, ¯rm i o®ers a contract, hires men and women
as it wishes and a subsequent promotion subgame ensues (without presence
of another ¯rm). Consider a promotion subgame after ¯rm i has o®ered a
contract si and hired measure ¹i = (¹i
m;¹i
f) of workers where ¹i
m + ¹i
f = 2,
which we denote by (si;¹i)-subgame. Since no promotions would take place
if upper-tier salaries are lower than the wage for low-tier jobs, it su±ces to
consider the cases that si
g ¸ wg, g = m;f, with at least one strict inequality.14
Consider a promoted worker in an arbitrary equilibrium of (si;¹i)-subgame.
If this worker is male, it is clear that the ¯rm would not pay him more than si
m
because paying more would only incur higher expense without any bene¯t. If
this worker is female and she does not leave in the middle of period 2, the ¯rm
realizes at that point that her outside option is no longer relevant and thus
would pay no more than si
f for the remainder of period 2. Foreseeing this, she
would leave for her outside option if and only if µ > si
f, i.e., her decision to
leave depends only on the contracted salary level si
f. Understanding all this,
the ¯rm would pay her no more than si
f throughout period 2. This estab-
lishes that any promoted worker would be paid exactly the contracted salary
while on the job. It then follows, as the next lemma states, that all promoted
workers of the same gender will have exerted the same level of e®ort and that
no rationing of promotion takes place among workers who extended non-zero
e®ort. The basic idea behind this is that rationing in promotion would be
broken by some workers exerting a slightly higher e®ort level to break the tie
and ensure promotion; and no worker would exert a higher e®ort than any
other, indistinguishable worker for promotion in the absence of rationing in
promotion.
14Allowing other si's only complicates exposition with no additional results or insights.An Economic Theory of Glass Ceiling 13
Lemma 1. In any equilibrium of (si;¹i)-subgame, all promoted workers
of gender g will have exerted the same e®ort level, say eg, and get paid exactly
the contracted salary, si
g, while on the job. In addition, if eg > 0, all workers
of gender g who exert eg get promoted, and all other workers exert e = 0.
Proof. It has been shown above that all promoted workers are paid exactly
the contracted salary while on the job. To reach a contradiction, suppose there
is rationing in promoting workers who exerted a certain e®ort level, say e0 > 0.
Note that e0 is the lowest e®ort level that workers may get promoted with,
for otherwise (Ci) implies that the ¯rm would lose the lawsuits ¯led by those
who are rationed out after exerting e0. This also implies that the measure of
workers who exert an e®ort level strictly above e0, if exist, is strictly less than
1. Note that 1+e0¡si
g ¸ 0 if workers of gender g are promoted after exerting
e0, since otherwise the ¯rm would not have promoted them. Thus, a worker
who deviates by exerting a slightly higher e®ort than e0 (instead of e0), bene¯ts
by warranting him/herself sure promotion owing to (Ci)-(Cii) because e0 > 0
implies si
g > wg. Since this would contradict e0 being an equilibrium e®ort
level, we conclude that any rationing, if it exists, would be among workers
who exerted e = 0 and it would be possible only if they will get the same
level of compensation promoted or not (for otherwise they would bene¯t by
exerting small e > 0 for the same logic as above). Then, there is no more
than one e®ort level for each gender, say eg, that leads to promotion, since
all workers prefer lower e®ort conditional on the same salary afterwards. Any
worker who does not exert this e®ort level would not be promoted, so exerts
e = 0.
In an equilibrium of the (si;¹i)-subgame, the e®ort level that workers of
gender g exert for promotion, which we denote by eg, determines their deci-
sions as to whether to pursue promotion or not, and the ¯rm's surplus from
promoting them. For notational ease, we denote si = (sm;sf) in this section.
Male workers would pursue promotion only if sm ¡ (em)2=2 ¸ 1, with
certainty if the inequality is strict, because the payo® they can guarantee
themselves from forgoing promotion is 1. Subject to this constraint, the ¯rm's
surplus per male promotion, 1 + em ¡ sm, is uniquely maximized at em = 1
and sm = 1:5, i.e., when the e±ciency is achieved by equating the marginal
revenue and the marginal cost of e®ort. This proves
Lemma 2. The maximum possible equilibrium surplus of a ¯rm per male
promotion is 0.5, which is possible if and only if em = 1 and sm = 1:5.
As will become clear below, these are the equilibrium terms of promotion
for men.
Next, we consider female workers whose optimal behavior depends on theirAn Economic Theory of Glass Ceiling 14









because she would leave the post for her outside option at midpoint of pe-
riod 2 if µ > sf. If she forgoes promotion, she would exert no e®ort, get a
low-tier job for a wage of wf < 1, and would leave the employment for a non-








Thus, a female worker of type µ would pursue promotion if uh(µjef;sf) > u`(µ)
and forgo promotion if the reverse inequality holds.
Whether women of types µ > sf would pursue promotion is critical for
the ¯rm's surplus because any such woman, by leaving at mid-career, would
curtail any revenue that might be forthcoming otherwise. To understand when
this happens and when not, observe that the graph of u`(µ) is °at at the level
of wf for µ · wf, then increases with a slope of 1/2 for µ > wf. Similarly,
that of uh(µjef;sf) is °at at the level of sf ¡ (ef)2=2 for µ · sf and increases
with a slope of 1/2 for µ > sf.
First, if sf ¡ (ef)2=2 < wf in equilibrium, the graph of uh(µjef;sf) lies
entirely below that of u`(µ) because sf ¸ wf, whence no women would pursue
promotion. Also, if ef = 0, the ¯rm's expected pro¯t from promoting any
woman would be 1
2(1 ¡ sf)(1 + D(sf)) = 1
2(1 ¡ sf)(1 + ®sf) < 0:07 since she
would leave if her type exceeds sf ¸ wf > 0:9, rendering women much less
productive resource than men who can generate a surplus of 0.5 by Lemma 2.
These cases do not arise in equilibrium and have little bearing on our analysis,
so will no longer be discussed. Hence, we consider sf > wf below.
Next, if uh(µjef;sf) > u`(µ) for all µ ¸ 0 so that the graph of uh(µjef;sf)
lies entirely above that of u`(µ) then women of all types pursue promotion.
In this case we de¯ne the threshold (type), which is denoted by µc and codes
the marginal type women of types below which pursue promotion, to be 1.
Also, if the upward-sloping part of uh(µjef;sf) falls on that of u`(µ), women
of types µ < sf de¯nitely pursue promotion (since sf > wf) whilst women
of all other types are indi®erent and some of them may pursue promotion
(and leave at midpoint). However, the exact subset of types who pursue
promotion only to depart later, is inconsequential so long as the measure of
such a subset, say ³ ¸ 0, is unchanged because they do not a®ect any other
aspect of the equilibrium. Thus, we assume without loss of generality that
women pursue promotion if and only their types are below the threshold µc
de¯ned by D(µc) = D(sf) + ³ in this case. Note that sf < µc if ³ > 0.An Economic Theory of Glass Ceiling 15
Finally, the remaining possibility is that the graph of uh(µjef;sf) either
crosses that of u`(µ) from above at exactly one point, or overlaps with it for
µ · wf and lies below it for µ > wf.15 In the former case, women pursue pro-
motion if and only if their types are below the crossing point which therefore
constitutes the threshold, de¯ned by
µ
c(ef;sf) = 2sf ¡ wf ¡ (ef)
2: (3)
In the latter case, only women whose types are below wf may pursue pro-
motion out of indi®erence and exactly who do so is inconsequential for the
same reason as above. So, we assume that women pursue promotion if and
only their type is below the threshold µc de¯ned by D(µc) being equal to the
fraction of women that pursue promotion in equilibrium.
Note that our notion of threshold type enables us to consider only the
\cuto®-style" equilibria of (si;¹i)-subgames in which women pursue promo-
tion if and only if their types are below a certain threshold µc ¸ 0. If µc > sf,
some women of types above sf pursue promotion only to leave afterwards.
Such equilibria of (si;¹i)-subgames are referred to as equilibria \with depar-
tures." However, these do not arise along the equilibrium path. In all other
equilibria of (si;¹i)-subgames, i.e., with µc · sf, any woman who chooses to
pursue promotion will never leave the post, which we refer to as \departure-
free" equilibria.
We now examine the possible equilibrium surplus of a ¯rm per female pro-
motion. Focusing on departure-free equilibria with threshold µc 2 (wf;1=®),
the ¯rm's surplus per female promotion is bounded above by
max
ef¸0;sf¸µc 1 + ef ¡ sf s:t u`(µ
c) = uh(µ
cjef;sf) (4)
where the constraint is equivalent to ef =
p
2sf ¡ wf ¡ µc since sf ¸ µc > wf.
It is straightforwardly veri¯ed that if µc · 1 + wf then sf ¸ µc does not bind
and the solution to (4) is (ef;sf) = (1;
1+wf+µc
2 ); If µc > 1 + wf, on the other
hand, the constraint sf ¸ µc binds, so the solution is (ef;sf) = (
p
µc ¡ wf;µc).
Therefore, the optimized per-promotion surplus is 1:5¡
wf+µc
2 for µc · 1+wf
and 1+
p
µc ¡ wf ¡µc for µc > 1+wf and thus, it exceed the per-promotion
surplus from men, 0.5, if and only if µc < ¹ µ := 2 ¡ wf < 1 + wf.
If µc · wf in departure-free equilibria, sf ¡ (ef)2=2 = wf as discussed
above. In this case, by solving maxef;sf 1+ef¡sf subject to sf¡(ef)2=2 = wf,
we get the maximum per-promotion surplus of 1:5 ¡ wf, which is obtainable
when ef = 1 and sf = 0:5 + wf. Since per-promotion surplus is lower in
equilibria with departures (as shown in Appendix), we have the next lemma.
15The two graphs coincide everywhere if sf = wf and ef = 0, a case we dismissed earlier.An Economic Theory of Glass Ceiling 16
Lemma 3. Fix an arbitrary µ 2 (0; ¹ µ] where ¹ µ = 2 ¡ wf. The maximum





1:5 ¡ wf for µ < wf,
1:5 ¡
wf+µ
2 ¸ 0:5 for µ 2 [wf; ¹ µ] with strict inequality if µ < ¹ µ.






0:5 + wf < 1:5 for µ < wf,
1+wf+µ
2 · 1:5 for µ 2 [wf; ¹ µ] with strict inequality if µ < ¹ µ.
Note that ¼¤
f(µ) + s¤
f(µ) = 2. In particular, ¼¤
f(µ) strictly decreases in µ 2
[wf; ¹ µ] from ¼¤
f(wf) = 1:5 ¡ wf > 0:5 down to ¼¤
f(¹ µ) = 0:5. If the equilibrium
threshold type is µ > ¹ µ, the per-promotion surplus is less than 0.5.
Proof. See Appendix.
A graphical illustration is useful. Consider µc 2 (wf; ¹ µ) depicted in the
¯rst diagram of Figure 3. The graph of u`(µc)+c(ef) in the second diagram is
the set of all pairs (ef;sf) that would induce the threshold µc as per (3). The
¯rm's surplus, 1+ef¡sf, is depicted by the horizontal distance between 1+ef








2 > µc because 1 + wf > ¹ µ > µc, i.e., the °at part of the graph of
uh(µjef;sf) crosses the upward-sloping part of the graph of u`(µ) as depicted
in the ¯rst diagram, hence no promoted women leave their posts mid-career.
[Figure 3 about here]
We are now ready to examine a monopoly ¯rm's optimal hiring between
male and female workers. We begin with the following observation.
Lemma 4: In any continuation equilibrium after a ¯rm o®ers a contract
si = (s;s) where s > 1:1, all promoted workers will have exerted the same
e®ort e¤ =
p
2s ¡ 2 > 0 and will never leave their posts.
Proof: Since men would pursue promotion only if s ¡ e2
m=2 ¸ 1, i.e.,
em · e¤ =
p
2s ¡ 2, where em is the e®ort level they exert for promotion,
1 + e¤ ¡ s is the maximum possible surplus per male promotion.
First, consider the case that 1 + e¤ ¡ s > 0, so that s 2 (1:1;3). Let
ef denote the e®ort level exerted by any promoted women, which is unique
if exists by Lemma 1. If ef > e¤ in any equilibrium after si = (s;s) is
o®ered, then i) no men would be promoted since otherwise women could
have guaranteed promotion by exerting e 2 (em;ef) due to (Ci) given ef >An Economic Theory of Glass Ceiling 17
e¤ ¸ em and thus, ii) all upper-tier posts should be ¯lled by women since
otherwise women could have guaranteed promotion by exerting e 2 (e¤;ef)
due to (Cii). This would require that at least one half of women get promoted,
i.e., u`( 1
2®) · uh( 1
2®jef;s) ) ef · maxf
q
2s ¡ wf ¡ 1
2®;
p
s ¡ wfg < e¤ where
the inequality follows from s > 1:1, given wf 2 (0:9;1) and ® 2 (0;1=4),
contradicting ef > e¤. Thus, we deduce that ef · e¤ in any equilibrium after
si = (s;s) is o®ered. Consequently, the maximum possible total surplus of
the ¯rm is 1 + e¤ ¡ s, which is feasible only if all promoted workers will have
exerted e¤ and measure 0 of them leave their posts.
Hence, it su±ces to show that a continuation equilibrium exist in which
the ¯rm's total surplus is 1 + e¤ ¡ s. To do this, note from (H1)-(H2) that
the ¯rm can ensure to hire some measure ¹i
m ¸ 1 of men and measure ¹i
f =
1 ¡ ¹i
m of women. Then, not all upper-tier posts are ¯lled by women: If
they were, we would have u`( 1
®) · uh( 1
®jef;s) which would imply ef < e¤
since s 2 (1:1;3) given wf 2 (0:9;1) and ® 2 (0;1=4), whence men would
guarantee promotion by exerting some e 2 (ef;e¤) by (Ci). In light of (Cii),
this means that some men get promoted in equilibrium after exerting em ·
e¤. Thus, women of su±ciently low µ should get promoted as well due to
(Ci) because u`(0) = wf < 1 · uh(0jem;s). Given ¹i
m ¸ 1, this means
that men should be indi®erent between pursuing promotion and not, i.e.,
em = e¤ and consequently, ef = e¤ since otherwise (Ci) would dictate that
some workers can bene¯t by exerting slightly less e®ort. Hence, in the unique
continuation equilibrium women exert e¤ if and only if their types are below
µc(e¤;s) = 2¡wf < 1:1 < s and measure 1¡¹i
fD(µc(e¤;s)) < 1 of men exert
e¤. Consequently, the ¯rm's total surplus is 1 + e¤ ¡ s, as desired.
Next, suppose 1+e¤ ¡s · 0, so that s ¸ 3. Then, any surplus of the ¯rm
would come from female promotion. If 1 + ef ¡ s > 0 where ef is the e®ort
level that promoted women will have exerted, then 2[u`( 1




f > minfwf+ 1
2®¡2s;wf¡sg+(s¡1)2 > 0 where
the last inequality ensues because s ¸ 3, wf 2 (0:9;1) and ® 2 (0;1=4), which
would imply that less than one half of women pursue promotion. Since men
would not exert more than e¤ · s ¡ 1 < ef, this would contradict ef being
equilibrium e®ort level because women would guarantee promotion by exerting
e 2 (e¤;ef) due to (Ci) or (Cii). Hence, we conclude that 1 + ef ¡ s · 0 and
thus, any promoted worker will have exerted e = s ¡ 1. No promoted women
would leave because 2[u`(s) ¡ uh(sjs ¡ 1;s)] = wf + s2 ¡ 3s + 1 > 0.
Lemma 4 highlights a key aspect of our framework: Firms know that
o®ering women the same promotion deal as men would be enough to erase all
di®erences between the two genders (unless they o®er very ine±cient deals,
i.e., s < 1:1, which is easily veri¯ed to be suboptimal), in the sense that
all promoted women would exert the same e®ort level as men, and wouldAn Economic Theory of Glass Ceiling 18
remain in their posts with certainty throughout period 2. These women would
therefore be identical to their male counterparts in all respects. We stress that
this result holds for ¯rms engaged in Bertrand competition as well, since the
proof does not rely on the ¯rm being a monopolist.
This observation is crucial for interpreting our results. In particular, it
shows that, if any di®erence between male and female promotion contracts
persists in equilibrium, this cannot be justi¯ed by invoking di®erences in the
two genders' propensity to leave their high-rank jobs. Our model therefore
allows us to investigate whether the di®erential treatment su®ered by women
with respect to promotion may survive independently of an often-invoked
argument, namely that ¯rms are less eager to promote women because women
are more likely to leave their posts afterwards.
We characterize a monopoly ¯rm's optimal strategy below, which indeed
treats women di®erently from men. Recall from Lemma 2 that this ¯rm, i,
can extract the maximum possible per-promotion surplus of 0.5 from men by
o®ering sm = 1:5 and inducing em = 1. In fact, a ¯rm can guarantee an
equilibrium in which all upper-tier posts generate a surplus of 0.5 by hiring
measure 2 of men after o®ering a male salary sm = 1:5.16 Thus, the ¯rm may
bene¯t by promoting women only if per-promotion surplus exceeds 0.5 for
women. By Lemma 3, this is feasible in equilibria with threshold µ 2 (0; ¹ µ).
In such an equilibrium of (si;¹i)-subgame, women pursue promotion if
and only if their types are below the threshold, say µ, and hence, the measure
of promoted women is ¹f®µ < 1 where the inequality follows because ¹f ·
2; ® · 1=4 and ¹ µ < 2. The remaining upper-tier posts (of measure 1¡¹f®µ)
may be ¯lled by measure 2 ¡ ¹f of men to the extent possible. Letting ¼g
denote the equilibrium per-promotion surplus for gender g workers, therefore,
the ¯rm's total surplus is no higher than ¼f¹f®µ+¼m maxf2¡¹f;1¡¹f®µg
which, in light of the upper bounds of ¼m and ¼f identi¯ed in Lemmas 2 and
3, achieves the maximum value of





when ¹f = 1=(1 ¡ D(µ)) 2 (1;2), ¼f = ¼¤
f(µ) and ¼m = 0:5. Indeed, for
threshold µ 2 (wf; ¹ µ), the ¯rm obtains a total pro¯t equal to this upper bound
in the unique equilibrium of the continuation subgame ensuing the ¯rm's o®er
of a contract (sm;sf) = (1:5;s¤
f(µ)), as stated in the next lemma.
Lemma 5. (a) A monopoly ¯rm i's total surplus in any equilibrium with
threshold µ · ¹ µ is bounded above by ¦L(µ), which strictly increases in µ · wf
16Exactly measure 1 of men pursue promotion by exerting e = 1 in equilibrium: If less
than measure 1 were to pursue, deviation by exerting an e®ort level slightly less than 1
would warrant promotion by court protection (Cii) and thus, bene¯cial.An Economic Theory of Glass Ceiling 19
and is strictly concave in µ 2 [wf; ¹ µ] with a unique maximum at
^ µ = arg max
wf·µ·¹ µ
¦L(µ) < ¹ µ: (6)
(b) For µ 2 [wf; ¹ µ], (s¤(µ);¹)-subgame has a unique equilibrium if
¹f · ¹
¤




In this equilibrium, measure 1¡¹fD(µ) of men and all women of types below µ
exert e = 1 and get promoted, so the ¯rm's surplus, 0:5+¹fD(µ)(¼¤
f(µ)¡0:5),
strictly increases in ¹f from 0.5 when ¹f = 0 to ¦L(µ) when ¹f = ¹¤
f(µ).
(c) For µ 2 [wf; ¹ µ], the ¯rm's surplus is strictly lower than ¦L(µ) in any
equilibrium of any (s¤(µ);¹)-subgame if ¹f > ¹¤
f(µ).
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 5 establishes that a ¯rm optimally extracts a higher surplus from
promoting women compared with men, by o®ering an inferior contact. This
happens because the utility that women of a su±ciently low type µ can expect
to obtain if they forgo promotion, u`(µ), is smaller than 1, the utility that a
man can obtain in the same contingency. Intuitively, by forgoing promotion
and therefore entering the low-tier job market, low-type women would be
pooled with high-type women who would depart for their outside option, and
would therefore be paid a low wage that re°ects the departure risk of the pool.
Since the utility that they can expect to earn if they forgo promotion is lower
than that of men, low-type women are therefore willing to pursue promotion
even if their deal is inferior to that o®ered to men. Note that this result
depends on women's type being their private information. The inability of
employers to observe a woman's type is thus a key ingredient of our analysis.
Not also that, faced with an unconstrained labor force, a ¯rm would opti-
mally hire (and promote) a positive mass of both men and women even if the
pro¯t that the ¯rm earns from each promoted woman exceeds what it earns
from promoting a man. Conditional on a particular threshold type µ, hiring
too many women, i.e., more than measure ¹¤
f(µ) of them, would result in too
few workers pursuing promotion: Out of all women hired by the ¯rm, only
a fraction D(µ) < D(¹ µ) < 0:5 decide to go for promotion, resulting in some
upper-tier posts remain un¯lled even after promoting all men. Thus, the ¯rm
would bene¯t by hiring more men so as to be able to ¯ll up all remaining
upper-tier posts with men, which happens when ¹f = ¹¤
f(µ). On the other
hand, if too few women were to be hired, i.e., if ¹f < ¹¤
f(µ), then the ¯rm
could increase its pro¯ts by hiring more women so as to ¯ll a larger fraction
of upper-tier posts by \higher-yielding" women.
Lemma 5 leads to the equilibrium outcome of a monopoly ¯rm described
in Theorem 1 below, for which we need the following technical result:An Economic Theory of Glass Ceiling 20
Lemma 6. Any (si;¹i)-subgame has an equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
Theorem 1. If there is a monopoly ¯rm, in the unique equilibrium out-
come the ¯rm maximizes its total surplus by o®ering sm = 1:5 and sf = s¤
f(^ µ)
and then hiring measure ¹¤
f(^ µ)2(1;2) of women and measure 2¡¹¤
f(^ µ) of men;
Women of types below ^ µ and all men exert e = 1 and get promoted.
Proof. In any equilibrium of any (si;¹i)-subgame, the ¯rm's total surplus
is no higher than 0.5 if the threshold exceeds ¹ µ. Thus, Theorem 1 follows from
Lemmas 5 and 6.
It is evident from Theorem 1 that women are treated unfavorably in pro-
motion: They have to work as hard as men to be promoted even if they know
that they will be paid strictly less after promotion (s¤
f(^ µ) < sm = 1:5). This
treatment is unjusti¯ed since, as shown in Lemma 4, o®ering sf = sm would
be su±cient to ensure that promoted women exert the same e®ort as men and
remain in their posts with certainty throughout period 2, making them fully
identical to men from the employer's perspective. Part of the rationale for
the result is that the monopoly employer capitalizes on its market power to
extract a higher surplus from some women who are more desperate than men
in pursuing promotion since their alternatives are worse. However, surplus-
extraction by a monopoly employer is only part of the story. The next section
characterizes the equilibrium o®ers when ¯rms engage in Bertrand competi-
tion for employees. Most surprisingly, we show that the di®erential treatment
su®ered by promoted women survives even in this case.
4. Unique Equilibrium under Bertrand Competition
In light of the hiring rules in the presence of a rival ¯rm, (H1) and (H2),
each ¯rm's critical concern is whether to try to assume the leader status by
o®ering a contract of a higher value than the rival's. Recall that the value
v(s) of a contract s is the ex ante utility of a female worker in the continuation
equilibrium most favored by the ¯rm, following the ¯rm's o®er of s. For s¤(µ)
where µ 2 [wf; ¹ µ], therefore,
v(s






because, by Lemma 5, measure ¹¤
f(µ) of women are hired and they pursue
promotion when their types are below µ in the unique equilibrium of the
continuation subgame ensuing an o®er of s¤(µ). Note that, abusing notation
slightly, we also use v(¢), as a function of µ, to represent ex ante utility of
a female worker in a departure-free equilibrium with threshold µ. Clearly,An Economic Theory of Glass Ceiling 21
v(µ) is constant at v(wf) for µ · wf and strictly increases for µ ¸ wf. That
v(s) ¸ v(wf) for all s is trivial since women get v(wf) by forgoing promotion.
It is intuitive (and proved in Appendix) that o®ering a contract of a value
larger than v(¹ µ) is suboptimal because the maximum possible surplus thereof
falls short of 0.5 which can be guaranteed by s¤(µ) for µ 2 (wf; ¹ µ) according to
Lemma 5. Thus, we focus on contracts with values between v(wf) and v(¹ µ).
For µ 2 [wf; ¹ µ], Lemma 5 (b) and (c) establish that the unique equilibrium
ensuing a ¯rm's o®er of s¤(µ), conditional on the ¯rm becoming a leader, de-
livers ¦L(µ) to the ¯rm, the maximum possible surplus subject to o®ering a
contract of value v(µ). Furthermore, if an equilibrium with threshold µ gen-
erates a surplus of ¦L(µ), the equilibrium contract must be s¤(µ) by Lemmas
2 and 3 and the discussion surrounding derivation of (5). Consequently, s¤(µ)
is the uniquely optimal contract for a ¯rm to o®er among all contracts whose
value is v(µ), conditional on the ¯rm becoming a leader.17 Since s¤(µ) is an
optimal contract among those with the same value, v(µ), conditional on the
¯rm becoming a follower as well (as is shown in Appendix), we have
Lemma 7. In any equilibrium, both ¯rms o®er a contract in
S
¤ = fs
¤(µ) j wf · µ · ¹ µg: (9)
Proof. See Appendix.
It is clear from Lemma 5 that both ¯rms would have liked to obtain the
maximum possible surplus, ¦L(^ µ) = maxµ ¦L(µ), by hiring measure ¹f(^ µ) > 1
of women after o®ering s¤(^ µ), but this is not possible because hiring more than
half of the total women workforce requires the ¯rm being a leader in hiring,
and not both ¯rms can do so. Furthermore, Bertrand competition implies
that achieving ¦L(µ) for any other µ 6= ^ µ by o®ering s¤(µ) and acquiring the
leader status, would not be viable in equilibrium unless the other ¯rm can
also obtain at least the same payo® as a follower, for otherwise the other ¯rm
would snatch the leader status by \overbidding" marginally.
In order to see when this may be the case, from Lemma 5 we derive the
surplus of a ¯rm as a follower when it has o®ered s¤(µ0), i.e, conditional on the
other ¯rm having o®ered s¤(µ) where µ 2 (µ0; ¹ µ] and hired measure ¹¤
f(µ) > 1
of women as per Lemma 5, leaving measure 2¡¹¤
f(µ) of them for the follower:
¦F(µjµ







0) ¡ 0:5): (10)
17However, s¤(µ) is not optimal among all contracts such that sf = s¤
f(µ). For example,
if µ > ^ µ then increasing sm may lower the threshold so that ¦L(µ) is higher (hence lower
v), and consequently leads to a higher total surplus, albeit it is not optimal for the reduced
threshold. This is why we opted against de¯ning v(¢) as v(s) = sf.An Economic Theory of Glass Ceiling 22
It is straightforward to verify that ¦F(µjµ0) is strictly concave as a function
of µ0 ¸ wf, and strictly decreases in µ0 2 (wf; ¹ µ) because
µ




f(µ) ¡ 0:5) = wf (11)
as a routine calculation shows. That ¦F(µjµ0) peaks at µ0 = wf, which is due
to wf > 0:9, is unimportant for our results but facilitates exposition: This
implies that the lower is the threshold of the o®ered contract, s¤(µ) 2 S¤, the
higher is the ¯rm's pro¯t conditional on becoming a follower.
Given µ0 2 (µ¤¤; ¹ µ), note from (10) that ¦F(µjµ0) strictly decreases in µ · ¹ µ
because ¼¤
f(µ0) > 0:5. To examine the relationship with ¦L(µ), note also that
¦L(µ0) > ¦F(µ0jµ0) since ¹¤
f(µ0) > 1, whilst ¦L(¹ µ) = 0:5 < ¦F(¹ µjµ0). In ad-
dition, it is a straightforward calculation to verify that ¦L(µ) has a steeper
slope than ¦F(µjµ0) when they intersect in (µ0; ¹ µ).18 Letting µ¤ 2 (µ¤¤; ¹ µ) de-
note the unique µ that satis¯es ¦L(µ) = ¦F(µjµ¤¤), these observations produce
the graphs of ¦L(µ) and ¦F(µjµ¤¤) in Figure 4. The graph of ¦L(µ) peaks at
^ µ 2 [wf; ¹ µ). The dotted curve represents ¦F(µjµ0) for an arbitrary µ0 2 (µ¤¤; ¹ µ).
[Figure 4 about here]
As illustrated in Figure 4, for any pair of threshold levels, say µA and
µB in [µ¤¤;µ¤), it cannot be an equilibrium that ¯rm i o®ers a contract s¤(µi),
i = A;B, because the ¯rm that were to o®er a contract with a lower threshold,
say µA · µB, would do better by o®ering a contract with a threshold slightly
higher than µB, say µB +² < µ¤, which would secure the leader status for ¯rm
A and a payo®, ¦L(µB +²), that exceeds the payo® that it can get by o®ering
s¤(µA), ¦F(µBjµA), since ¦F(µBjµA) · ¦F(µBjµ¤¤) < ¦L(µB). In addition,
it cannot be an equilibrium that either ¯rm, say B, o®ers a contract s¤(µ)
where µ 2 [µ¤; ¹ µ], either, because then ¯rm A's best response would be to o®er
s¤(µ¤¤), which in turn implies that ¯rm B should o®er s¤(^ µ), or s¤(^ µ + ²) if
^ µ = µ¤¤, rather than s¤(µ¤).
This leads us to conclude that the ¯rms use a mixed strategy in contract
announcement in equilibrium. The next theorem characterizes a symmet-
ric equilibrium in which the two ¯rms randomize over s¤(µ) where µ ranges
between µ¤¤ and an upper bound e µ < µ¤, and exhibits the aforementioned
features of the glass ceiling. In fact, it is the unique equilibrium outcome.
18Intersection means D(µ)(¼¤
f(µ) ¡ 0:5) = (1 ¡ 2D(µ))D(µ0)(¼¤
f(µ0) ¡ 0:5). It su±ces to
























wf ¡ µ0 ¡ µ) · ®
2(2 ¡ 3wf) < 0, where the ¯rst equality follows from the equation above,
the ¯rst inequality from D(µ0) · D(µ), the second equality from D(µ) = ®µ, the second
inequality from wf · µ0 · µ, and the ¯nal inequality from wf > 0:9.An Economic Theory of Glass Ceiling 23
Theorem 2. The game described in Section 2 has a unique equilibrium
outcome. It is symmetric: both ¯rms o®er a contract s¤(µ) according to a
continuous distribution function on µ with a support [µ¤¤; e µ] where e µ 2 (^ µ;µ¤)
and ¦L(e µ) < ¦F(µ¤¤jµ¤¤). The ¯rm's ex ante equilibrium payo® is ¦L(e µ) >
¦L(µ¤) > 0:5. Furthermore,
(i) The ¯rm, say i 2 fA;Bg, that o®ers a contract with a higher threshold,
say µi, hires measure ¹¤
f(µi) of women and measure 2¡¹¤
f(µi) of men, and the
other ¯rm hires the residual labor force;
(ii) The ex ante utility of women is higher when hired by the ¯rm that
o®ers a contract with a higher threshold;
(iii) Every promoted female worker in either ¯rm will have exerted the
same e®ort as men (e = 1) and will never leave the ¯rm, but will be paid
strictly less than men.
The proof primarily consists of showing that there is a unique distribution
function on S¤ that satis¯es the incentive compatibility conditions for every
contract in its support, which gets lengthy and hence is deferred to Appendix.
A few aspects of the equilibrium call for discussion. First, the glass-ceiling
features described in Theorem 2 also emerge in an alternative model in which
the two ¯rms announce their contracts sequentially in a pre-determined order.
In this model a unique equilibrium exists in pure strategies: The ¯rst ¯rm
o®ers s¤(µ¤) and becomes a leader and the second ¯rm o®ers s¤(µ¤¤) and
becomes a follower. The mixed strategy in Theorem 2 is necessary because
the sequence of pure best responses \cycles." This is reminiscent of a capacity-
constrained Bertrand duopoly model of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983, Lemma
6), however the analysis di®ers due to one signi¯cant technical feature, namely,
that the threshold of the optimal contract to o®er as a follower, µ¤¤, may in
our model be strictly below that as a leader, ^ µ.
Second, although both ¯rms follow the same equilibrium strategy, the com-
petitive outcome characterized in Theorem 2 is essentially asymmetric: ¯rms
di®er in the actual contracts they o®er to female workers. The ¯rm that o®ers
a better contract (i.e., a higher female salary) faces an unconstrained female
workforce, since it is the workers' favorite employer. The other ¯rm faces
a constrained female workforce, since its female contract is less attractive.
Hence, in equilibrium, more and less \female-friendly" ¯rms coexist.
Third, the equilibrium in Theorem 2 exhibits that women are disadvan-
taged in compensation but not in the requirements for promotion. This is
because e±cient promotion requirement is the same for men and women and
the ¯rms can freely control the salary level to adjust the attractiveness of
promotion package without distorting e±ciency. However, one can think of
reasons that the core forces of Theorem 2 may cause disadvantage for women
in promotion requirements as well as in compensation. For example, if ¯rmsAn Economic Theory of Glass Ceiling 24
are constrained by a lower bound in the upper-tier salary for some reason
(e.g., social norm, limits on salary di®erence for same jobs), the harsh treat-
ment in equilibrium may be partly re°ected as tougher promotion criteria.
Alternatively, if the exerted e®ort is observed with some noise, even if the
promotion criteria are similar (as in Theorem 2), it is conceivable that women
of very low types would exert more e®ort than men because they face worse
consequences in case of non-promotion.
Extensions
E®ort is unveri¯able. We carried out our analysis presuming that the
e®ort level is su±ciently veri¯able so that the workers are protected by the
court if they do not get promoted \unfairly." This aspect has the e®ect of
pinning down the e®ort levels that are viable in equilibrium, and guarantees
uniqueness of equilibrium. In many circumstances, though, e®ort levels may
be too costly to verify. In the extreme case where it is unveri¯able at all,
equilibrium e®ort levels are supported by self-con¯rming beliefs. It is natural
in this case that there exist multiple equilibria, supported by various self-
con¯rming workers' belief pro¯les over the e®ort levels required in order to
achieve promotion. It is straightforward to verify that the equilibrium in
Theorem 2 continues to be an equilibrium in this case, supported by the
belief that any women who exert an e®ort level less than 1 will be perceived
to be of a very high type who will leave in the middle of her career, hence
will not be promoted. In addition, there are a variety of equilibria, both in
pure and mixed strategies, that maintain the core features of the equilibrium
identi¯ed in Theorem 2, namely that promoted women may end up being paid
less and/or exerting more e®ort than their male counterparts. It may be worth
stressing that ¯rms may actively try to in°uence workers' beliefs{for instance,
by taking speci¯c actions, setting precedents, or even by making \cheap-talk"
declarations. These actions/declarations may act as devices to coordinate
workers' beliefs over the terms under which promotion may be achieved for
male/female workers in di®erent ¯rms. Naturally, whenever possible, each
¯rm would ¯nd it optimal to shape workers' beliefs so as to maximize its
expected pro¯t, taking beliefs over the other ¯rm as given, which if successful
would lead to an equilibrium akin to that of Theorem 2.
Contracts also specify wage in period 1. In the main analysis, for ease of
exposition we disallowed a contract to specify a wage for period 1. Relaxing
this restriction does not change the result. The core logic behind this conclu-
sion is straightforward: Any wage for period 1 simply increases the workers'
utility by the same amount regardless of what they do, without any strategic
implication, and thus, does not a®ect workers' decisions as to whether to pur-
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women at the hiring stage as our analysis made clear, this means that ¯rms
would not o®er a positive ¯rst-period wage for men.
For women as well, for any given µ 2 (0; ¹ µ), it is a routine calculation
to verify that, conditional on being a leader, a ¯rm obtains a higher surplus
by o®ering a female contract s¤(µ) without period 1 wage than it does by
o®ering any other female contract of the same value. The basic reason is
that since period 1 wage is paid to all women hired, a ¯rm cannot recover
that extra expense from the smaller number of women who would pursue
promotion without lowering the ex ante value of the contract.19 The same is
also true conditional on the ¯rm being a follower. Hence, ¯rms would not o®er
a positive wage for period 1 for women, either. As a consequence, Theorem 2
continues to holds when contracts specify a wage for period 1 as well.
More than two ¯rms. Our main insights extend to cases of more than
two ¯rms. It is straightforward to verify that, if e®ort levels are unveri¯able,
\glass ceiling" equilibria can be sustained by self-con¯rming beliefs of workers
on appropriate promotion strategies that vary across ¯rms, regardless of the
number of ¯rms. The situation is less clear-cut if e®ort levels are veri¯able,
though, since the complexity of the model rapidly increases with the number
of ¯rms competing in the market. However, our analysis has identi¯ed a key
19For any period 1 female wage s1 > 0, the expected utility of a woman from forgoing
promotion is u`(µjs1) = s1 + u`(µ). Let (s1;s) denote a contract specifying s1 for period
1 and sf for period 2 conditional on promotion for women, such that the value of (s1;s)
is equal to v(µ0) for some µ0 2 (µ; ¹ µ). Note that this implies that the expected payo® of
a woman in period 2 is strictly lower than µ0 under (s1;s) and thus, there is a threshold
type µ00 < µ0 who is indi®erent between pursuing promotion or not under (s1;s). Since
the ¯rm would be worse o® if µ00 = 0, assume µ00 > 0. Since women of all types µ · wf
would be indi®erent if µ00 · wf, we may assume that µ00 2 [wf;µ0). Note that µ00 is uniquely
determined by µ0 and s1 because s1+v(µ00) = u`(µ00)D(µ00)+
R
µ>µ00 u`(µ)dD = v(µ0) and v(µ)
increases in µ 2 [wf; ¹ µ]. Since the maximum possible surplus of ¯rm subject to inducing
µ00 is ¦L(µ00) as per Lemma 3, the ¯rm's surplus from o®ering (s1;s) is no higher than
¦L(µ00) ¡ s1¹¤
f(µ00) conditional on becoming a leader. We now show that ¢ := ¦L(µ00) ¡
s1¹¤
f(µ00)¡¦L(µ0) < 0 for all relevant parameter values, i.e., for all s1 > 0, wf 2 (0:9;1) and
µ0 2 (0:9;4=3). Since ¢ = 0 if s1 = 0 by de¯nition, it su±ces to show that ¢ decreases in
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, which is negative because (2+®(2+wf))(2+wf +2µ0)
achieves its maximum value when (®;wf;µ0) = (1=4;1;4=3) and it is smaller than 16. Next,












¡16s1 + ®(2 + wf + 2µ0)2 is routinely veri¯ed to achieve its
maximum value when (®;wf;µ0;s1) = (1=4;1;4=3;0) and it is smaller than 2. Therefore,
¢top is negative for all relevant parameter values as desired. The same can be analogously
veri¯ed for the contingency of the ¯rm becoming a follower.An Economic Theory of Glass Ceiling 26
rationale behind our results, namely that ¯rms do not want to hire too many
women at the entry stage. Intuitively, a ¯rm hiring too many women would
¯nd it hard to ¯ll all its upper-tier posts and at the same time o®er women
promotion packages that are inferior to those of men. Consider, for instance,
a ¯rm that hires only women. To ¯ll all its upper-tier posts, at least one
half of its workforce must pursue promotion. To achieve this, women must
be o®ered su±ciently favorable promotion packages, i.e., more favorable than
those o®ered to men. But then, it is undesirable for the ¯rm to hire only
women in the ¯rst place, which would bring a contradiction. This argument
applies whenever the share of women hired is \too large," and it ensures that
there is an upper bound on the share of women that ¯rms will optimally
hire. This basic aspect of our framework remains in force when we allow
for more than two ¯rms and consequently, our results extend to such cases.
To be precise, for any given number of ¯rms, one can ¯nd an open set of
environments (i.e., parameter values) for which our results hold. On the
other hand, ¯xing an environment, our results may cease to hold if there are
too many ¯rms.
5. Policy Analysis
A key result of our analysis is that promoted women are worse o® than their
male counterparts, since they have to show their determination by working
at least as hard as the equivalent male would do, even though they antici-
pate poorer compensation after promotion. Although this is not a result of
discrimination in the conventional sense, it is the case that women who wish
to be promoted may have to accept a worse deal because, and only because,
they are female. In this sense career women are clearly disadvantaged in the
workplace.
As highlighted in the previous section, in our model the disadvantaged
treatment su®ered by women in upper-tier jobs is essentially a spillover of
the wage di®erential in low-tier jobs. In low-tier jobs, women always leave
when encountered by a non-market option (since in this case the value of
their non-market option is strictly higher than that from remaining in the
job). Hence, on average, the surplus generated by a woman is strictly below
that of a man. This results in women earning strictly lower wages than men in
low-tier jobs. Note however that although the wage earned by women in the
low-tier market re°ects their average productivity, some women|those with a
low propensity of leaving for the outside option|would ¯nd it less than their
(expected) productivity. For those women, the existence of more \family-
oriented" fellow women imposes a negative externality. This externality is
key to the disadvantaged treatment su®ered by women in upper-tier jobs.
A natural policy to consider to eliminate the problem is to require thatAn Economic Theory of Glass Ceiling 27
¯rms o®er the same wage to men and women in low-tier jobs. From our
earlier analysis, it is clear that if wf = wm then a ¯rm would be unable to
extract more surplus from promoted women than promoted men. However,
it is doubtful that such a policy would be e®ective. Essentially, women in
low-tier jobs are on average less productive than men. A policy that obliges
¯rms to pay their male and female employees exactly the same low-tier wage
would act as a tax on ¯rms that hire a mixed labor force. A likely outcome
is that, to circumvent the policy, ¯rms would \specialize", and employ only
female or only male workers in low-tier jobs. Under perfect competition, in
each type of ¯rm employees would be paid their expected productivity, but,
crucially, wages in ¯rms specialized in female workers would be lower than
those in ¯rms specialized in male workers. Thus, imposing gender-free wages
in low-tier jobs may not alleviate the glass-ceiling phenomenon in upper-tier
posts, since male/female wage di®erentials in low-tier jobs may persist in spite
of the policy.
Below we review a number of policy measures that target ¯rms' promotion
decisions more directly, and discuss the extent to which they may alleviate
the glass-ceiling phenomenon.
(a) Gender-free contracts for upper-tier jobs. Consider a policy requiring
that all contracts o®ered must be gender-free, i.e., the same set of contracts
are available for workers of either gender to choose one from and apply for.
So long as the belief is viable that women would get treated favorably both
in hiring and promotion only when they select the \right" contract, outcomes
where promoted women su®er a disadvantage vis-µ a-vis men may still emerge
in equilibrium.
To formalize this general observation, we need to modify the hiring process
of our model as follows:
1) Both ¯rms simultaneously announce one menu of post-promotion salaries.
2) Every worker applies to both ¯rms by selecting one salary each from their
menus (as the terms of employment to be considered for).
3) Firms simultaneously make employment o®ers to workers who, if pursued
by both ¯rms, decide which one to accept.
4) The promotion subgame ensues in each ¯rm as described in Section 2.
Consider the equilibrium of Theorem 2 embedded in the modi¯ed model
with the following o®-equilibrium belief: neither ¯rm would hire any women
who select the \men's salary." Note that this belief is justi¯ed in the case of
unilateral deviation by a female worker, because the leader ¯rm can achieve
its ideal entry-level hiring without including the deviator and the follower ¯rm
would be able to ¯ll all its upper-tier posts as it wishes regardless of whether
it hires the deviated worker or not (since only a fraction of workers with the
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not bene¯cial and consequently, the equilibrium of Theorem 2 continues to be
an equilibrium under this policy as stated in the next Proposition. Note that
this result is valid regardless of whether ¯rms have a continuum of positions
to ¯ll or ¯nitely many of them.
Proposition 1. The following is an equilibrium of the game modi¯ed
as above: The two ¯rms announce a contract (as a menu of post-promotion
salaries without being gender-speci¯c) in the same manner as in Theorem 2;
all male workers select s = 1:5 and all female workers select the other salary
for both ¯rms; the two ¯rms hire as in Theorem 2 and all agents behave in
the subsequent promotion subgame as in Theorem 2.
Di®erent salaries that ¯rms o®er in this equilibrium can be interpreted
as corresponding to potentially di®erent \career-paths" that appear to be
available for all in principle, but in practice are intended for di®erent types
of workers. In particular, female workers may understand that, if they wish
to achieve promotion, then they should follow the path that was intended for
them. Thus, it is possible for ¯rms to implement harsher promotion terms for
women than for men and consequently, the glass ceiling equilibrium described
in Theorem 2 still emerges, supported by the belief that the ¯rms would not
hire any women who indicate that they intend to pursue the \wrong" career
path (namely, that intended for men). This e®ect is even more prominent
when e®ort level is not veri¯able, because in that case ¯rms would be at
more liberty to mistreat those women who choose the wrong path. Therefore,
although there are other equilibria, including one in which all workers get
promoted on the same terms, putting this policy in place does not warrant
transition to a more equitable promotion outcome.
(b) A certain fraction of women must be promoted. Now consider an al-
ternative policy that requires each ¯rm to promote at least a ¯xed fraction,
say x 2 (0;1), of its female employees. Under this policy, if a ¯rm hires a
measure ¹f 2 [0;2] of women, then they must promote at least measure x¢¹f
of women. Clearly, this requires that all women of type µ < D¡1(x) pursue
promotion. Hence, this policy e®ectively imposes restrictions on the contracts
that ¯rms may o®er: the marginal female type who would pursue promotion
must be no lower than D¡1(x). If x > D(µ¤¤), therefore, this policy would
improve the ex ante welfare of women. Nevertheless, the e®ect of this policy
falls short of removing gender di®erential so long as x < D(¹ µ), and the main
features of the glass ceiling will remain (albeit to a lesser degree) in the en-
suing equilibrium. If x > D(¹ µ), on the other hand, a reversed glass ceiling
phenomenon arises: men work as hard as women to get promoted, yet they
are paid less than their female counterparts. Only when x = D(¹ µ), such a
policy would correct the glass ceiling phenomenon. Furthermore, such rem-
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permanently, for the competitive equilibrium would reemerge when the policy
is lifted.
Proposition 2. Suppose that a policy requires ¯rms to promote at least a
¯xed fraction x of their female employees. If x · D(µ¤¤), Theorem 2 continues
to hold. If D(µ¤¤) < x < D(¹ µ), any equilibrium conforms to the equilibrium
described in Theorem 2 with the following modi¯cation: µ¤¤ is replaced by
µx = D¡1(x) and e µ by an appropriate e µ0 2 (^ µ; ¹ µ) such that ¦L(e µ0) < ¦F(µxjµx).
If x = D(¹ µ), in equilibrium both ¯rms o®er the same salary, 1.5., to both men
and women. If x > D(¹ µ), men are o®ered a contract that is inferior to that
o®ered to women.
Proof. See Appendix.
(c) A certain fraction of upper-tier positions must be held by women. Con-
sider now a variant policy, namely, that a certain fraction, say y, of all upper-
tier posts should be occupied by women in both ¯rms.20 Although policies
(b) and (c) may at ¯rst glance appear similar { they both impose quota re-
quirements on the ¯rms { there are important qualitative di®erences between
the two. To see this, note that the requirement imposed by policy (b) has
the same bite, independently of the number of women present in a ¯rm. By
contrast, the requirement imposed by policy (c) may be more or less stringent,
depending on the number of female workers available. Clearly, if a ¯rm has
a small female workforce then the requirements of policy (c) may be ful¯lled
only if a large fraction of those women actually get promoted, whilst it can be
satis¯ed more easily if a ¯rm has a large female workforce. In contrast with
policy (b), therefore, policy (c) lowers a follower's payo® more than it does
a leader's. This raises the relative value of obtaining a \leader" position in
the market, and thus strengthens the competitive pressure for ¯rms to attract
female workers. As a result, the \no-glass-ceiling" outcome can be sustained
more easily than under policy (b). Proposition 3 makes this point precise.
Proposition 3: There is y0 < D(µ) such that if a policy requires the ¯rms
to ¯ll a fraction y 2 [y0;D(µ)] of upper-tier posts with women, then in any
equilibrium both ¯rms o®er the same salary, 1.5., to both men and women
and all women of types µ < ¹ µ exert e = 1 and get promoted.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3 highlights how, under policy (c), the \no-glass-ceiling" equi-
librium may be achieved for a \wide" range of y values. By contrast, under
policy (b) this is only possible if x is precisely equal to D(¹ µ) { something
20This policy has been adopted for instance by Norway, where, from 1 January 2008, it
has become compulsory for companies to allocate 40% of their management board seats to
women. Similarly, Spain has recently passed legislation obliging some large companies to
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that is virtually impossible to achieve if policy-makers are less than perfectly
informed. In this sense, therefore, policy (c) appears more promising in elim-
inating the glass-ceiling phenomenon, since it imposes less stringent informa-
tional requirements on planners. Note however that, similar to policy (b),
policy (c) o®ers only a temporary remedy and may generate a \reversed glass
ceiling" phenomenon if y > D(¹ µ).
6. Concluding Remarks
Beyond policy interventions, another often-invoked vehicle for eliminating dis-
criminatory outcomes is competition. As argued by Becker (1957), in the pres-
ence of taste-based discrimination, su±ciently strong competition between
¯rms should eliminate any type of di®erential treatment of employees. In our
framework, however, competition has limited e®ect: ¯rms compete Bertrand-
style for female employees but they are nonetheless able to hire women at
remuneration levels that do not re°ect their productivity in upper-tier jobs.
Intuitively, even though promoted women are more pro¯table than promoted
men, this does not imply that ¯rms bene¯t from hiring as many women as
possible. As discussed earlier, a monopolist would not ¯nd it optimal to hire
only women, since this would either generate vacancies in upper-tier posts, or
it would result in the ¯rm having to o®er very generous promotion packages to
induce \family-oriented" women (i.e., with a high µ) to pursue promotion. An
implication of this is that in a \women only" world women would be better o®
than they currently are, since they would not su®er from internal competition
from male employees.
The motivations that lead a monopolist to refrain from hiring only women
also carry over to an environment where ¯rms compete for employees, en-
suring that the incentives to \overbid" one's rival to gain a leader position
are relatively weak. As a result, competition for women at the hiring stage is
never too strenuous, and does not eliminate the di®erential treatment su®ered
by promoted women in our equilibrium.
An alternative way in which competition between ¯rms may operate is
in ex-post stage, i.e., after employees have made their human-capital invest-
ment/e®ort choice in period 1. Although such competition may in principle
lower the ¯rms' ability to extract greater surplus from female employees, there
are at least two reasons for why this e®ect may not be big.21 First, since an em-
ployee's e®ort choice is not readily observable to outsiders (as in our model),
poaching employees from a rival ¯rm before promotion decisions involves a
21This is backed for instance by Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994), who provide a
detailed (and rather unique) analysis of twenty years of personnel data from one ¯rm.
They ¯nd that the percentage of outside hires to total hires in a position is declining in the
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risk, as poached employees could turn out to have low human capital. Sec-
ond, if employees acquire human capital that is partly ¯rm-speci¯c (see e.g.,
Becker, 1962) competition between ¯rms is weakened even after human-capital
investment choice is observed, e.g., after promotion decisions are made.
To summarize, in this paper we provide an economic model that explains
the glass ceiling phenomenon as a natural equilibrium outcome of Bertrand
competition in the labor market. Our ¯ndings suggest that, because of the
speci¯c nature of the problem at hand, competition between ¯rms falls short
of eliminating this phenomenon. The implications are also less than promising
as to what can be done to improve things for career women. Insisting that
contracts cannot be gender-speci¯c may not change the situation. Imposing
a quota for women in senior positions, is subject to problems, too. One is
that, to get the proportion right, the planner may need to have a great deal
of information, although to a lesser degree when the quota is imposed rela-
tive to available posts. Perhaps more importantly, a short-lived intervention
will not solve the problem since the discriminatory practice would re-emerge
once it is lifted, unlike in most statistical discrimination models. In terms of
the application of our results, as explained earlier, they may be more widely
applicable than gender, e.g., to other observationally distinct groups such as
immigrant employees.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3. Given the discussion preceding Lemma 3, it only remains
to verify that per-promotion surplus in any equilibrium with departures, i.e., with
threshold µ > sf, is less than ¼¤
f(µ) for µ · ¹ µ and less than 0.5 for µ > ¹ µ.
We start with the cases that µ 6= 1, i.e., µ 2 (sf;1=®), so that uh(sfjef;sf) =
u`(sf) which implies that ef =
p
sf ¡ wf. Thus, the per-promotion surplus is
~ ¼(sfjµ) := (1 +
p
sf ¡ wf ¡ sf)








sf ¡ wf ¡ sf
´
(12)
and its ¯rst and second derivatives with respect to sf are
~ ¼0(sfjµ) =
³
1 ¡ 2sf ¡ µ +









³3sf ¡ µ ¡ 4wf
8(sf ¡ wf)3=2 ¡ 1
´
: (13)
Since it is routinely calculated that ~ ¼00(sfjµ) < 0 and ~ ¼0(µjµ) > 0 for wf · sf ·
µ · ¹ µ = 2¡wf and wf 2 (0:9;1), it follows that ~ ¼(sfjµ) increases in sf 2 (wf;µ) ifAn Economic Theory of Glass Ceiling 32
µ · ¹ µ. Since, in addition, ¼¤
f(µ)¡ ~ ¼(µjµ) decreases in µ < ¹ µ with a positive value at
µ = ¹ µ, we have ¼¤
f(µ) > ~ ¼(µjµ) ¸ ~ ¼(sfjµ) for all sf 2 [wf;µ) if µ · ¹ µ.
Next, consider µ 2 (¹ µ;1=®). For sf < ¹ µ, since (12) decreases in µ, we have
~ ¼(sfjµ) · ~ ¼(sfj¹ µ) < ~ ¼(¹ µj¹ µ) < 0:5 because ~ ¼(sfj¹ µ) has been veri¯ed above to increase
in sf 2 (wf; ¹ µ) and ~ ¼(¹ µj¹ µ) = 1 +
p
2 ¡ 2wf ¡ (2 ¡ wf) < 0:5. For sf 2 [¹ µ;µ), we
have ~ ¼(sfjµ) · ~ ¼(sfjsf) < 0:5 because ~ ¼(sfjsf) = 1 +
p
sf ¡ wf ¡ sf is routinely
veri¯ed to be strictly concave in sf > 0 with a maximum of 5=4 ¡ wf < 0:5 at
sf = (1 + 4wf)=4 > ¹ µ for wf 2 (0:9;1).
Finally, if the threshold of an equilibrium is 1 then ef ·
p
sf ¡ wf and thus,
per-promotion surplus is (®sf +1)(1+ef ¡sf)=2 · (sf +4)(1+
p
sf ¡ wf ¡sf)=8 <
0:5 where the last inequality is easily veri¯ed for wf 2 (0:9;1) and sf ¸ wf.
Proof of Lemma 5: (a) Fix a threshold type µ · ¹ µ. As per the explanation
preceding Lemma 5, the ¯rm's total surplus is no higher than ¼f¹f®µ+¼m maxf2¡
¹f;1 ¡ ¹f®µg where ¼m · 0:5 and ¼f · ¼¤
f(µ). Thus, it is bounded above by
¹f®µ(¼¤




f(µ) + (2 ¡ ¹f)0:5 otherwise:
This upper bound increases in ¹f for ¹f < 1
1¡®µ, but decreases for ¹f > 1
1¡®µ since
®µ¼¤
f(µ) < 0:5 by Lemma 3 because ® < 1=4, ¹ µ = 2 ¡ wf and wf > 0:9. Therefore,
it is highest when ¹f = 1=(1 ¡ ®µ) > 1, producing ¦L(µ) de¯ned in (5).
Next, it is routinely calculated that ¦0
L(µ) =
®(1¡wf)




(1¡®µ)3 < 0 for µ 2 [wf; ¹ µ], establishing that ¦L(µ) achieves a
unique maximum at a point, say ^ µ 2 [wf; ¹ µ]. That ^ µ < ¹ µ follows from ¦0
L(¹ µ) =
®(1¡¹ µ+(®¹ µ2¡wf)=2)
(1¡®¹ µ)2 < 0.
(b) Fix µ 2 [wf; ¹ µ] and consider (s¤(µ);¹)-subgame with ¹f · ¹¤
f(µ). Since
µ = µc(1;s¤
f(µ)), the following is straightforwardly veri¯ed to be an equilibrium:
women pursue promotion if and only if of types below µ by exerting e = 1 and
measure 1 ¡ ¹fD(µ) of men pursue promotion by exerting e = 1. Thus, ¯rm's
surplus is 0:5 + ¹fD(µ)(¼¤
f(µ) ¡ 0:5), which strictly increases in ¹f from 0.5 when
¹f = 0 to ¦L(µ) when ¹f = ¹¤
f(µ). That this is the unique equilibrium of (s¤(µ);¹)-
subgame follows from the following somewhat more general result.
[A] In (s;¹)-subgame with v(s) = v(µ) for some µ 2 [wf; ¹ µ], suppose there is a
departure-free equilibrium, called the \core" equilibrium, in which the ¯rm's total
surplus exceeds 0.5, the female worker's ex ante utility is v(µ). Then, this is the
unique equilibrium of (s;¹)-subgame.
Since we already showed that the ¯rm's surplus cannot exceed 0.5 from promot-
ing workers of only one gender, both genders get promoted in the core equilibrium,
so that sm¡(em)2=2 ¸ 1 and sf¡(ef)2=2 ¸ wf where eg is the promotion e®ort level
for gender g in the equilibrium. Moreover, the per-promotion surplus for female
must exceed 0.5 due to Lemma 2, and that for male must be positive (since total
surplus from female promotions cannot exceed 0.5), i.e., ¼m = 1+em ¡sm > 0 and
¼f = 1+ef ¡sf > 0:5. In light of (Ci), this in turn implies that ef = em = e¤ > 0.An Economic Theory of Glass Ceiling 33
To reach contradiction, suppose there is another equilibrium, in which gender
g exert e0
g for promotion (if they get promoted). It is not possible that gender g
workers exert e0
g such that 1+e0
g¡sg = 0 for then, more workers of gender g pursue
promotion than in the core equilibrium, whence less of the other gender should
pursue promotion by exerting e0 ¸ e¤ for there to be no rationing in promotion
(Lemma 1), but then the latter gender would bene¯t by exerting e 2 (e0
g;e0) due to
(Ci){(Cii). The only exception to this logic is when e0
g = 0 and sg = wg, which is
feasible only for g = m, i.e., sm = 1, which would imply that men would exert e > 0
in no circumstances, contradicting the existence of the core equilibrium. Therefore,
we deduce that 1 + e0
g ¡ sg > 0 for g = m;f, and e0
f = e0
m = e0 due to (Ci).
Recall that sm ¡ (e¤)2=2 ¸ 1, i.e., men weakly prefer pursing promotion in
the core equilibrium. Thus, any equilibrium with e0 > e¤ is not viable because
then a strictly lower measure of workers would pursue promotion than in the core
equilibrium, leaving some upper posts un¯lled; Any equilibrium with e0 < e¤ is not
either because then more than measure 1 of workers would pursue promotion (note
that it is not viable that no worker of one particular gender pursues promotion
in this case because some worker of that gender, the lowest type if female, would
bene¯t by exerting e¤, guaranteeing promotion). This prove [A].
(c) Fix µ 2 [wf; ¹ µ] and consider (s¤(µ);¹)-subgame with ¹f > ¹¤
f(µ). For the
same reason as above, em = ef = e¤ > 0. Then, e¤ ¸ 1 is not viable because
¹f®µ + 2 ¡ ¹f < 2 ¡ ¹¤
f(µ)(1 ¡ ®µ) · 1, i.e, some upper posts are unoccupied so
that deviation of exerting slightly less e®ort level pays o® due to (Cii). If e¤ < 1,
all men get promoted, and all upper posts must be ¯lled since otherwise e¤ >
0 would not be viable due to (Cii). Thus, ¹f®µc(e¤;s¤
f(µ)) + 2 ¡ ¹f = 1, i.e.,
¹f®(2s¤
f(µ)¡wf ¡(e¤)2) = ¹f ¡1 , ¹f®(1+µ ¡(e¤)2) = ¹f ¡1. Consequently,
¯rm's total surplus is
¦(¹f) = ¹f®(2s¤
f(µ) ¡ wf ¡ (e¤)2)(1 + e¤ ¡ s¤
f(µ)) + (2 ¡ ¹f)(1 + e¤ ¡ 1:5)
= (¹f ¡ 1)(1 + e¤ ¡ s¤
f(µ)) + (2 ¡ ¹f)(1 + e¤ ¡ 1:5)
= (¹f ¡ 1)(1 ¡ s¤
f(µ)) + (2 ¡ ¹f)(1 ¡ 1:5) + e¤
= (¹f ¡ 1)(1 ¡
1 + wf + µ
2
) ¡ 1 + ¹f=2 +
s
1 + µ ¡
¹f ¡ 1
¹f®
= (1 ¡ ¹f)
1 + wf + µ
2
¡ 2 + 3¹f=2 +
s




and its derivative is
¦0(¹f) = 1 ¡







¹f(1 ¡ ¹f(1 ¡ ® ¡ ®µ))
: (14)
It is routine calculation to verify that ¤ is quasi-convex in ¹f > 0 with a minimum
value of ¤0 = 16(1 ¡ ® ¡ ®µ)
p
1=® ¡ 1 ¡ µ=(3
p
3) at ¹f = 3
4(1¡a®¡®µ). It is then
straightforwardly veri¯ed that ¦0(¹f) increase in ® > 0, decrease in wf > 0, and
that conditional on ® = 1=4 and wf = 0:9 it increases in ¹f 2 [¹¤
f(µ);2] with aAn Economic Theory of Glass Ceiling 34
negative value at ¹f = 2 > ¹ µ. Therefore, the ¯rm's total surplus strictly decreases
in ¹f ¸ ¹¤
f(µ).
Proof of Lemma 6. Fix si = (sm;sf) and ¹i = (¹m;¹f). For each possible
equilibrium e®ort e ¸ 0, all men go for promotion if e < ¹ em :=
p
2sm ¡ 2 ,
sm¡(e)2=2 > 1; all men are indi®erent if e = ¹ em; and none of them go for promotion
if e > ¹ em. The per-promotion surplus of ¯rm is 1 + e ¡ sm which is positive i®
e ¸ em := 1 ¡ sm. Hence, male promotion is feasible only if Em := [em; ¹ em] 6= ;.
On the other hand, the measure of women who may go for promotion is positive
only if e · ¹ ef :=
p
2(sf ¡ wf), and gradually increases as e decreases until e = p
sf ¡ wf, and all women go for promotion if e <
p
sf ¡ wf. The ¯rm's per-
promotion surplus (conditional on no departure) is 1 + e ¡ sf which is positive i®
e ¸ ef := 1 ¡ sf. Hence, female promotion is feasible only if Ef := [ef; ¹ ef] 6= ;.
We prove the Lemma for the case that Em 6= ; 6= Ef here, because all other
cases are straightforward. First, consider the contingency that em ¸ ef. Suppose,
in addition, that ¹ em ¸ ¹ ef. Then, as e decreases from ¹ em, the total measure of
workers who pursue promotion, ¹p(e), is ¹m for e 2 Em nEf; ¹m +D(µc(e;sf)) for
e 2 Em \ Ef; D(µc(e;sf)) for e 2 Ef n Em. If ¹m ¸ 1, it is an equilibrium that
measure 1 of men exert ¹ em and get promoted. If there is e¤ such that ¹p(e¤) ¸ 1,
it is an equilibrium that e¤ is the e®ort for workers pursuing promotion for both
genders. Otherwise, it is an equilibrium that all men exert em and women exert
ef such that D(µc(ef;sf)) = 1 ¡ ¹m. On the other hand, if ¹ em < ¹ ef, then ¹p(e)
decreases in e 2 Em[Ef so that there is e¤ such that ¹p(e¤) ¸ 1 and hence, there is
an equilibrium in which e¤ is the equilibrium promotion e®ort level for both genders
similarly to above. The argument is analogous for the alternative contingency that
¹ em < ¹ ef, hence is omitted.
Proof of Lemma 7. Step i: Firms can guarantee a surplus > 0:5. After o®ering
s¤(µ) for some µ 2 (wf; ¹ µ), a ¯rm, say i, can hire measure ¹¤
f(µ) of women if it
becomes the leader, and ensure to hire measure ¹f · 1 of women otherwise by
(H1)-(H2). Consequently, it can guarantee a total surplus higher than 0.5 unless
the other ¯rm hires measure 2 of women as a leader, in which case ¯rm i's surplus
is 0.5. This also implies that neither ¯rm ever hires measure 2 of women as a leader
along the equilibrium path: If a ¯rm were to do so, its surplus is strictly less than
0.5 when it becomes a leader as we have shown already and, since its surplus as a
follower cannot be any higher, the ¯rm's strategy is dominated. Thus, we proved
that both ¯rms can guarantee a surplus exceeding 0.5.
Step ii: Firms only o®er s with v(s) · v(¹ µ). Consider s such that v(s) = v(µ)
for some µ > ¹ µ. If ¯rm i o®ers such an s, by de¯nition of v(s), its total surplus
is strictly lower than 0.5 by Lemma 3 in the contingency of it becoming a leader.
Since its total surplus can be no higher when it becomes a follower, o®ering such s
is strictly dominated by o®ering s¤(µ) for some µ 2 (wf; ¹ µ) due to Step i.
Step iii: Leader ¯rms hire more than measure 1 of women. Suppose ¯rm i of-
fered s such that v(s) = v(µ) for some µ 2 [wf; ¹ µ]. (Note that µ ¸ wf since
v(s) ¸ v(wf).) Let ¹ = (¹f;2 ¡ ¹f) and ef be the hiring and female e®ort level in
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v(s), which we refer to as the \v-setting" equilibrium. Since the total surplus of this
equilibrium exceeds 0.5 by Step i, the per-promotion surplus must be greater than
0.5 for women, in particular, ¼f = 1+ef ¡sf > 0:5 ¸ ¼m = 1+em ¡sm > 0 where
the last inequality follows because a surplus exceeding 0.5 cannot be garnered from
women promotions alone. This in turn implies that ef = em = e¤ > 0 due to (Ci)
and that all upper posts are ¯lled due to (Cii).
Let µc denote the threshold in this equilibrium, i.e., women pursue promotion
i® their types are below µc. Suppose µc < wf. Then, sf ¡ (e¤)2=2 = wf and the




f(wf). Hence, if the ¯rm hired measure ¹¤
f(wf) of
women then the continuation equilibrium with threshold wf generates a higher
total surplus, ¹¤
f(wf)D(wf)¼f + (1 ¡ ¹¤
f(wf)D(wf))¼m, contradicting the initial
equilibrium being the v-setting one. Hence, µc ¸ wf.
Note that ¼f · maxwf·µ0·¹ µ ¼¤
f(µ0) = 1:5 ¡ wf · 0:6. If ¼m · ¼f=2, a ¯rm's
equilibrium surplus is bounded above by max0·¹f·2 ¹fD(¹ µ)0:6+(1¡¹fD(¹ µ))0:3 =
0:3(1+¹f®¹ µ) · 0:3(1+21
4(2¡wf) < 0:5, a contradiction to the initial equilibrium
surplus exceeding 0.5. Hence, ¼m > ¼f=2. Suppose departure takes place in the
initial equilibrium, i.e., µc > µ ¸ wf. Then, if the ¯rm hired measure ¹f ¡² (instead
of ¹f) of women where ² > 0 is small, there is an equilibrium in which women pursue
promotion with a slightly lower threshold and more men get promoted than in the
initial equilibrium, thus generating a higher total surplus, which would contradict
the initial equilibrium being the v-setting one. Hence, we conclude that the initial
equilibrium must be departure-free.
Thus, there is no other equilibrium in (s;¹)-subgame by the result [A] obtained
in the proof of Lemma 6. Consequently, either ¯rm, upon becoming a leader after
o®ering s such that v(s) = v(µ), can guarantee the maximum surplus possible after
o®ering s. Since ¼f > ¼m in this equilibrium, it is optimal for a ¯rm to hire measure
¹¤
f(µ) > 1 of women upon becoming a leader after having o®ered s.
Step iv: Firms do not o®er s 6= s¤(µ) such that v(s) = v(µ) for some µ 2 (wf; ¹ µ].
Consider S(µ) := fsjv(s) = v(µ)g where µ 2 (wf; ¹ µ]. Subject to o®ering s 2 S(µ) for
a ¯xed µ 2 (wf; ¹ µ], o®ering s¤(µ) is uniquely optimal conditional on being a leader
by Lemma 5. We now show that, subject to o®ering s with v(s) = v(µ), o®ering
s¤(µ) is uniquely optimal conditional on being a follower as well.
To reach a contradiction, suppose that a follower with residual female workforce
of measure ¹r
f < 1 obtains a surplus exceeding 0.5 after o®ering s = (sm;sf) 6= s¤(µ)
such that v(s) = v(µ) where µ 2 (wf; ¹ µ]. Let ¹0 and e0 be the hiring and female e®ort
level in the v-setting equilibrium. Since the surplus exceeds 0.5 in this equilibrium,
e0 = ef = em as before. By de¯nition, µ = 2sf ¡ wf ¡ (e0)2. Let ¼0
g = 1 + e0 ¡ sg.
First, suppose some men get promoted in the v-setting equilibrium and e0 = p
2sm ¡ 2 so that all men are indi®erent. Then, sf =
2sm¡2+wf+µ
2 and µ = µc(sf;e0).
Thus, the surplus with residual hiring ¹r




< 0:5 + ¹r
f®µ(1:5 ¡ s¤
f(µ)) if s 6= s¤(µ), i.e., o®ering s¤(µ) is strictly better.
Next, suppose some men get promoted in the v-setting equilibrium and e0 < p
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because slightly higher e®ort would increase total surplus (by enhancing e±ciency).
To see this, note that the equilibrium surplus is (2 ¡ ¹0
f)(1 + e0 ¡ sm) + ¹0
f®µ(1 +
e0 ¡ sf) > 0:5. The last inequality implies sf · sm. Then, from µ00 = µc(e00;sf) =
2sf ¡ wf ¡ (e0 + ±)2 = µ ¡ ±2 ¡ 2±e0 for e00 = e0 + ± > e0, we have
(2 ¡ ¹¤
f(µ00))(1 + e00 ¡ sm) + ¹¤
f(µ00)®µ00(1 + e00 ¡ sf)
= (2 ¡ ¹¤
f(µ00))(1 + e0 ¡ sm) + ¹¤
f(µ00)®µ00(1 + e0 ¡ sf) + ±
= (1 + e0 ¡ sm) + ¹¤
f(µ00)®µ00(sm ¡ sf) + ±









®(µ ¡ ±2 ¡ 2±e0)(sm ¡ sf) + ±
= (1 + e0 ¡ sm) + ¹0
f®µ(sm ¡ sf) +
³ 1










(1 ¡ ®(µ ¡ ±2 ¡ 2±e0))(1 ¡ ®µ)
´
(sm ¡ sf)± + ±
which can be shown to exceed (2¡¹0
f)(1+e0 ¡sm)+¹0
f®µ(1+e0 ¡sf) = (1+e0 ¡
sm) + ¹0
f®µ(sm ¡ sf) for su±ciently small ± > 0.
Lastly, suppose no men get promoted in the v-setting equilibrium. Then, either
¼0
f · 0 or ¹0
f®µ ¸ 1 , µ ¸ 1=(2®) ¸ 2 > ¹ µ = 2 ¡ wf, a contradiction.
Thus, we have shown that o®ering any s 6= s¤(µ) such that v(s) = v(µ) for some
µ 2 (wf; ¹ µ] is dominated by o®ering s¤(µ).
Step v: Firms do not o®er s 6= s¤(wf) such that v(s) = v(µ) for some µ · wf.
Any such s = (sm;sf) 6= s¤(wf) means sf ¡(e0)2=2 = wf so that e0 =
p
2(sf ¡ wf),
whence sm ¸ 1 + sf ¡ wf and 1 + e0 ¡ sm ·
p
2(sf ¡ wf) ¡ (sf ¡ wf) which is
uniquely maximized when sf = s¤
f(wf) and consequently, 1 + e ¡ sm · 0:5 and
1 + e ¡ sf · ¼¤
f(wf) with at least one strict inequality. Thus, o®ering such an s is
dominated by o®ering s¤(wf) when a follower as well as when a leader.
Proof of Theorem 2. Recall that Fi is a probability measure on R2
+ that repre-
sents ¯rm i's contract strategy. In light of Lemma 7, we treat Fi as a distribution
on the threshold type, i.e., Fi(X) = Fi(fs¤(µ)jµ 2 Xg) where X ½ [wf; ¹ µ] is mea-
surable. We also treat Fi as a cdf function so that Fi(µ) = Fi([0;µ]). Let supp(°)
denote the support of a probability measure °.
The proof consists of a series of lemmas. Lemmas A1-A2 characterize the sup-
port of equilibrium cdf's, Lemmas A3-A10 identify an equilibrium by imposing
incentive compatibility on the support, and Lemmas A11-A12 prove uniqueness.
Lemma A1. Let e µi = supsupp(Fi), i = A;B. Then, e µA = e µB 2 [^ µ;µ¤] and the
equilibrium payo®s of both ¯rms are ¦L(e µ) where e µ = e µA = e µB.
Proof. By Lemma 7, by o®ering s¤(µ¤¤) either ¯rm can guarantee a payo®
of ¦F(¹ µjµ¤¤) > 0:5 because the other ¯rm would hire measure ¹¤
f(µ) of women
when it becomes a leader after o®ering s¤(µ) for some µ 2 (µ¤¤; ¹ µ) due to Lemma
5. Consequently, o®ering s¤(µ) with µ > µ1 is strictly dominated where µ1 satis-
¯es ¦L(µ1) = ¦F(¹ µjµ¤¤), because the payo® from doing so is bounded above by
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¦F(µ1jµ¤¤) by o®ering s¤(µ¤¤) and thus, o®ering s¤(µ) with µ > µ2 is strictly dom-
inated where µ2 satis¯es ¦L(µ2) = ¦F(µ1jµ¤¤). Applying analogous arguments, we
deduce recursively that o®ering a contract with threshold µ > µn, n = 2;¢¢¢; is
strictly dominated where limn!1 µn = µ¤. Hence, e µi · µ¤ for i = A;B.
Without loss of generality, let e µA · e µB · µ¤. If e µA < ^ µ, ¯rm B will be a leader
for sure if it o®ers s¤(^ µ + ²) for any su±ciently small ² > 0, and thus, can ensure
a payo® arbitrarily close to ¦L(^ µ). Hence FB is a Dirac measure at ^ µ because the
only way for ¯rm B to get ¦L(^ µ) is to o®er s¤(^ µ) by Lemma 3. Then, ¯rm A can
guarantee itself a payo® arbitrarily close to ¦L(^ µ) by o®ering s¤(^ µ+²) for the same
logic as above, contradicting e µA < ^ µ. Hence, ^ µ · e µA must hold.
Once again by the same reasoning as above, ¯rm B can guarantee itself a payo®
arbitrarily close to ¦L(e µA) by o®ering s¤(e µA + ²) for a su±ciently small ² > 0.
Hence, ¯rm B should not o®er any contract s¤(µ) where µ > e µA by Lemma 3. Since
e µA · e µB by supposition, we have established e µA = e µB = e µ 2 [^ µ;µ¤]. Applying
the same argument one more time, we deduce that the equilibrium payo®s of both
¯rms are no lower than ¦L(e µ). In addition, e µ 2 supp(Fi) means that the ¯rm's
payo® is no higher than ¦L(e µ) because ¦L(µ) is an upper bound of ¯rm i's payo®
from o®ering s¤(µ) for µ near e µ by Lemma 3. Hence, it follows that ¦L(e µ) is the
equilibrium payo® of both ¯rms.
Lemma A2. There is µ 2 [µ¤¤; e µ) such that [µ; e µ] ½ supp(Fi) ½ fµ¤¤g [ [µ; e µ]
for i = A;B. Fi is nonatomic on (µ; e µ] for i = A;B, and µ is an atom for at most
one Fi. If µ > µ¤¤, FA(µ) 6= FB(µ) for some µ > µ.
Proof. We take granted that supp(Fi) ½ [µ¤¤; e µ] from (11) and Lemmas 7 and
A1, and that either ¯rm, upon becoming a leader after o®ering s¤(µ), µ > µ¤¤, hires
measure ¹¤
f(µ) of women and obtains ¦L(µ) from Lemma 5.
First consider the case that both supp(FA) and supp(FB) are convex sets.
Let µA = minsupp(FA) ¸ µB = minsupp(FB) ¸ µ¤¤. Note that µA = µB = µ
since otherwise we would have (µB;µA) 6½ supp(FB) because o®ering s¤(µ¤¤) is
dominant by (11), contradicting convexity of supp(FB). FA and FB are nonatomic
for µ 2 (µ; e µ] for otherwise supp(Fj) would not be convex due to:
[B] If Fi(fµ0g) > 0 where µ0 2 (µ¤¤; ¹ µ), then Fj([µ00;µ0]) = 0 for some µ00 < µ0
where j 6= i,
because one can ¯nd a su±ciently small ² > 0 such that Fi((µ0;µ0+²)) is arbitrarily
small and thus, ¯rm j 6= i would prefer o®ering s¤(µ0 + ²) to s¤(µ) with µ in a
small interval [µ00;µ0], since the former increases the chance of becoming a leader
by a discrete amount while marginally reducing the pro¯t in the contingency of
becoming a follower.
In addition, µ cannot be an atom for both FA and FB: If it were either agent
would bene¯t by o®ering s¤(µ+²) for su±ciently small ² > 0 by the same reason as
above. Consequently, µ = µ¤¤ since if µ > µ¤¤, given Fi(µ) = 0 for some i = A;B,
¯rm j 6= i would strictly prefer o®ering s¤(µ¤¤) to o®ering s¤(µ). This proves the
lemma when both supp(FA) and supp(FB) are convex sets.An Economic Theory of Glass Ceiling 38
To analyze the alternative case, we let V i(µ), i = A;B, denote ¯rm i's expected
payo® from o®ering s¤(µ) for µ 2 (µ¤¤; e µ], conditional on ¯rm j 6= i using the
equilibrium strategy Fj of contract announcement. De¯ne an auxiliary function
V i





¦F(zjµ)dFj; j 6= i: (15)
Note that V i
0(µj^ t) = V i(µ) for µ < ^ t if limz"µ Fj(z) = limz"^ t Fj(z).
Observe that V i
0(µj^ t) is strictly concave in µ < ^ t because both ¦L(µ) and ¦F(zjµ)
are strictly concave in µ. Suppose that Fj is continuous at µ = ^ t, i.e., Fj(f^ tg) = 0,
there exists an interval (t;^ t) such that (t;^ t)\supp(Fj) = ;, and
@V i
0(^ tj^ t)
@µ ¸ 0. Then,
for µ < ^ t with Fj(^ t) ¡ Fj(µ) = ± ¸ 0, we have





















0(µj^ t) < V i
0(^ tj^ t) = V i(^ t) · ¦L(e µ); (16)
where the ¯rst inequality follows because ¦L(µ) is an upper bound of i's payo® when
both ¯rms o®er s¤(µ), the second because ¦F(zjµ) decreases in z, the third from
¦L(µ) > ¦F(µjµ), the fourth because V i
0(µj^ t) is strictly concave and
@V i
0(^ tj^ t)
@µ ¸ 0, the
next equality because Fj(f^ tg) = 0, and the last inequality from ¦L(e µ) being the
equilibrium expected payo®. Since (16) implies that µ 62 supp(Fi), we have shown
[C] if (t;^ t) \ supp(Fj) = ;, Fj(f^ tg) = 0 and
@V i
0(^ tj^ t)
@µ ¸ 0, then limµ"^ t Fi(µ) = 0.
We consider the case that there is an interval (t;t0) such that [t;t0]\supp(Fi) =
ft;t0g for some i = A;B. Then, since V j(µ) = V
j
0 (µjt0) for µ 2 (t;t0) and V
j
0 (µjt0) is
strictly concave as shown above, (t;t0)\supp(Fj) is either empty or singleton. If it





By [C] with ¯rms' roles switched, t00 = minsupp(Fj) and consequently, t = µ¤¤.
However, if Fj(ft0g) = 0, then
@V i
0(t0jt0)
@µ ¸ 0 for otherwise o®ering s¤(t0 ¡ ²) would
be better than o®ering s¤(t0) for su±ciently small ² > 0, contradicting t0 2 supp(Fi)
and consequently, [C] would imply that t 62 supp(Fi), a contradiction. If Fj(ft0g) >
0, on the other hand, Fi(ft0g) = 0 by [B] and thus, a symmetric argument would
imply that t00 62 supp(Fj), a contradiction.
Hence, consider the case that (t;t0) \ supp(Fj) = ;. If Fj(ft0g) = 0, the same
argument as above would imply t 62 supp(Fi), a contradiction. If Fj(ft0g) > 0 so
that Fi(ft0g) = 0 by [B], as before we would have t0 = minsupp(Fj) and t = µ¤¤.
Note that in this case [t0; e µ] ½ supp(Fk) for k = A;B, because the argument up to
now have established that any open interval I with I \ supp(Fk) = finf I;supIgAn Economic Theory of Glass Ceiling 39
necessitates inf I = µ¤¤. Hence, Fk, k = A;B, is nonatomic for µ 2 (t0; e µ] by [B]
and thus, for all µ 2 (t0; e µ),
V k(µ) = ¦L(µ)F`(µ) +
Z
z>µ

















· 0; 8µ 2 (t0; e µ): (18)
Note that we must have
@V i
0(t0jt0)
@µ < 0 for t = µ¤¤ 2 supp(Fi) to hold as presumed.














@µ < 0 by continuity, contradicting t0 = minsupp(Fj). This
completes the proof of the Lemma.
By Lemmas A1 and A2, in equilibrium ¯rm i 2 fA;Bg o®ers contracts s¤(µ)
according to a continuous cdf Fi de¯ned on R+ with Fi(µ) = 0 and Fi(e µ) = 1 for
some µ 2 [µ¤¤; e µ). Thus, the following incentive compatibility condition must hold:
¦L(e µ) = ¦L(µ)Fj(µ) +
Z e µ
µ




¦F(¢jµ)dFj; j 6= i; 8µ 62 supp(Fi): (20)
At this point, a change of variable proves useful: de¯ne x = ¹ µ ¡ µ and
x¤ = ¹ µ ¡ µ¤; ^ x = ¹ µ ¡ ^ µ; x¤¤ = ¹ µ ¡ µ¤¤: (21)
Also de¯ne functions P;Q : [0; ¹ µ] ! R+ and ¯ : [0; ¹ µ] ! [0;1] as:





; and ¯(x) :=
1 ¡ 2®(¹ µ ¡ x)
1 ¡ ®(¹ µ ¡ x)
:
(22)
Recall from (6) and (11) that µ¤¤ · ^ µ, whence ^ x · x¤¤. We present the proof
presuming that ^ x < x¤¤, because the proof is only simpler if ^ x = x¤¤.
Lemma A3: (a) P(x) is a strictly concave function and peaks at ^ x.
(b) Q(x) = (1 ¡ ®¹ µ + ®x)P(x) is strictly concave and Q0(x¤¤) = 0 if x¤¤ < ¹ µ ¡ wf.
(c) ¯(x) is a strictly increasing and strictly concave function.
(d) Q(x)¯(z) = ¦F(zjx) ¡ 0:5.
(e) P(x) > Q(x¤¤)¯(x) 8x 2 (x¤;x¤¤].
(f) P(x¤) = Q(x¤¤)¯(x¤) < Q(x¤¤)¯(x¤¤).
Proof. Part (a) follows because ¦L(µ) is a strictly concave function and peaks
at ^ µ by Lemma 3. Parts (b) and (d) follow from (5), (11), (10) and (22). Part (c)
holds because ¯0(x) > 0 and ¯00(x) < 0 for x 2 [0; ¹ µ]. Parts (e) and (f) follow from
the relationship between ¦L and ¦F illustrated in Figure 4. .An Economic Theory of Glass Ceiling 40
Let e µ = maxsupp(Fi), i = A;B, as per Lemma A1, and a = ¹ µ ¡ e µ 2 [x¤; ^ x] and
b = ¹ µ¡µ 2 [^ x;x¤¤]. De¯ne Ga(x) := 1¡Fj(¹ µ¡x) and ga(x) :=
dGa(x)
dx on I ½ [a;b)
for which
dGa(x)
dx is well de¯ned. Since Ga is continuous and increasing, [a;b] n I
consists of at most countably many points. Then, (24) implies
P(x) ¢ (1 ¡ Ga(x)) + Q(x)
Z x
a
¯(z)ga(z)dz = P(a) 8x 2 [a;b): (23)
Note that (23) holds at x even if ga(x) is not de¯ned since
R x
a ¯(z)ga(z)dz is fully
determined by the values of ga at which it is de¯ned. Di®erentiation of (23) yields







ga(x) = 0 (24)
for x 2 I. Rearranging (24), we have
ga(x) =
R x
a K(x;z)ga(z)dz + P0(x)
P(x) ¡ Q(x)¯(x)
where K(x;z) := Q0(x)¯(z) ¡ P0(x) (25)
for x 2 I. Note, however, that if ga satis¯es (25) except for countably many points,
then (25) determines ga for all x 2 [a;b) uniquely and continuously. Hence, ¯nding
an equilibrium involves ¯nding a function ga that satis¯es (25), one for each ¯rm.
Lemma A4: In equilibrium, FA = FB; Ga(x) = 1 ¡ Fi(¹ µ ¡ x) is a nonatomic
distribution with support [a;x¤¤] where a 2 (x¤; ^ x), and its derivative, ga, solves (25).
Proof. The equation in (25) is a Volterra integral equation which has a unique
continuous solution ga(¢) on [a;b) by Proposition 5.7.4 of Marsden-Ho®man (1993).
Since Fj(¹ µ ¡ x) = 1 ¡ Ga(x) = 1 ¡
R x
a ga(z)dz by construction, this means that
FA(µ) = FB(µ) for all µ 2 (µ; e µ] in equilibrium and by Lemma A2, therefore, µ = µ¤¤
and Fi is nonatomic on [µ¤¤; e µ], i = A;B. Thus, the lemma is proved by applying
the Proposition 5.7.4 of Marsden-Ho®man again.
Consequently, any equilibrium is symmetric and ¯nding an equilibrium comes
down to identifying when, i.e., for which values of a, the solution ga is consistent with
Ga being a nonatomic cdf on [a;x¤¤]. To do this, below we examine the properties
of the function Ga that solves (24), or equivalently, (25), such that Ga(a) = 0 and
Ga(x¤¤) = 1. De¯ne ~ x and ¹ x < ¹ µ to be the values that satisfy, respectively,
P(~ x) = Q(x¤¤)¯(x¤¤) and P(¹ x) = P(x¤¤); so that ~ x < ¹ x · ^ x; (26)
where ¹ x = ^ x holds i® x¤¤ = ^ x = ¹ µ ¡ wf.
Lemma A5: If a 2 [~ x;x¤¤], then Ga(x) < 1 for all x 2 [a;x¤¤].
Proof. If, to the contrary, Ga(x) = 1 for some x 2 (a;x¤¤] then (23) would not
hold at x because Q(x)
R x
a ¯(z)ga(z)dz < Q(x¤¤)
R x
a ¯(x¤¤)ga(z)dz = Q(x¤¤)¯(x¤¤) =
P(~ x) · P(a). Hence, Ga(x) < 1 for all x 2 (a;x¤¤].
Hence, if Ga is a nonatomic cdf on [a;x¤¤], then a 2 (x¤; ~ x).An Economic Theory of Glass Ceiling 41
Lemma A6: If x0 = minfx 2 [x¤;x¤¤]jga(x) = 0g ¸ ^ x and Ga(x0) < 1, then
ga(x) < 0 for all x 2 (x0;x¤¤).
Proof. Since the derivative of the ¯rst two terms of (24) is
P00(x) ¢ (1 ¡ Ga(x)) ¡ P0(x)ga(x) + Q00(x)
Z x
a
¯(z)ga(z)dz + Q0(x)¯(x)ga(x); (27)
which is negative at x = x0 because P00(x0);Q00(x0) < 0 by Lemma A3, we de-
duce from (24) that ga is strictly decreasing at x0 (because ga(x0) = 0). Further-
more, since (27) stays negative for x > x0 so long as
R x
a ¯(z)ga(z)dz > 0, ga(x)
also stays strictly negative for x > x0 so long as
R x
a ¯(z)ga(z)dz > 0 by (24). If R x
a ¯(z)ga(z)dz · 0 for some x > x0, on the other hand, ga(x) stays negative due to
(24). Consequently, ga(x) < 0 for all x > x0.
Lemma A7: For a 2 [x¤; ~ x], if Ga(x) < 1 for all x · x0 where x0 · ^ x, then
ga(x) > 0 for all x 2 [a;x0].
Proof. Since ga that solves (25) is continuous and ga(a) > 0, negation of the
conclusion of the lemma would imply that ga(x) = 0 for some x 2 (a;x0], whence
(24) would fail at x00 = minfxjga(x) = 0g.
Lemma A8: Gx¤(x) = 1 for some x 2 [x¤;x¤¤],
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that Gx¤(x) < 1 for all x 2 [x¤;x¤¤]. By Lemma
A7, gx¤(x) > 0 on [x¤; ^ x]. Since the LHS of (23) would be strictly larger than the
RHS at x = x¤¤ if gx¤(x) ¸ 0 for all x 2 [x¤;x¤¤], there exists x0 = minfxjgx¤(x) =
0g 2 (^ x;1). Then Gx¤(x0) < 1 by (24) and thus, gx¤(x) < 0 for all x > x0 by Lemma











which is greater than P(x¤) at x = x¤¤ by Lemma A3 (c) and (f), failing (23).
Let a¤ = maxfa · ~ xjGa(x) = 1 for some x 2 [x¤;x¤¤]g, which exists by Lemma
A8 and continuity of the solution to (25).
Lemma A9: Ga¤(x) < 1 for all x 2 [x¤;x¤¤) and Ga¤(x¤¤) = 1.
Proof. If x0 = minfx < x¤¤jGa¤(x) = 1g exists, then
R x0
a¤ ¯(z)ga¤(z)dz > 0 by
(23) and thus, ga¤(x0) > 0 by Lemma A3 and (24), which in turn implies that
Ga¤(x0 + ²) > 1 for small ² > 0. This would contradict the continuity of the
solution to (25) because the solution Ga(¢) is bounded above by 1 for all a > a¤ by
the de¯nition of a¤ and Lemma A5.
Lemma A10: Ga¤ is a cdf with ga¤(x) > 0 for all x 2 [a¤;x¤¤).
Proof. By Lemmas A7 and A9, ga¤(x) > 0 for all x 2 [a¤; ^ x). If x0 = minfx 2
[^ x;x¤¤)jga¤(x) = 0g existed, then ga¤(x) · 0 for all x ¸ x0 by Lemma A6, i.e., Ga¤
would be non-increasing for x > x0. This would contradict Lemma A9.An Economic Theory of Glass Ceiling 42
To prove uniqueness, we suppose that Ga is a cdf for some a < a¤ and then
derive a contradiction to Ga(x¤¤) = 1 in the next two lemmas. Let G¤(x) = Ga¤(x)
and g¤(x) = ga¤(x). Note that g¤(x¤¤) = ga(x¤¤) = 0 from (24) and Q0(x¤¤) = 0.
Lemma A11: If a < a¤, then ga(a¤) < g¤(a¤) and ga(x) > g¤(x) for some
x 2 (a¤;x¤¤).
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that ga(a¤) ¸ g¤(a¤). Then, x0 = minfxjga(x) =
g¤(x)g 2 [a¤;x¤¤) should exist for Ga(x¤¤) = G¤(x¤¤) to hold. If x0 > ^ x, (25) would









a¤ K(x0;z)(ga(z) ¡ g¤(z))dz > 0 because i) ga(a¤) ¸ g¤(a¤)
and (25) imply
R a¤
a K(a¤;z)ga(z)dz ¸ 0 and ii) K(x;z) increases not only in z but
in x 2 (x¤; ^ x) as shown below:
K1(x;z) = Q00(x)¯(z) ¡ P00(x) > Q00(x) ¡ P00(x) > 2®P0(x) ¡ ®(¹ µ ¡ x)P00(x) > 0
(29)
where the second inequality follows from di®erentiaion of Q(x) = P(x)(1¡®(¹ µ¡x)).
Hence, we must conclude that ga(a¤) < g¤(a¤).
Then, (25) implies that
R a¤
a K(a¤;z)ga(z)dz < 0 and consequently,
R x
a K(x;z)ga(z)dz <
0 for x 2 (a;a¤) by (29). Hence, ga(x) < gx(x) for x 2 (a;a¤) and consequently, if
ga(x) · g¤(x) for all x 2 (a¤;x¤¤), from (23) we would have



















































P0(z)©(z)dz where ©(z) := Q(x¤¤)
¯(x¤¤) ¡ ¯(z)
2®P(z)(¹ µ ¡ z)
;




gz(z) by (25) and
Q(z) = P(z)(1 ¡ ®(¹ µ ¡ z)) and ¯(z) =
1¡2®(¹ µ¡z)
1¡®(¹ µ¡z) . Since ©(z) < 1 for x 2 (a;a¤) as
shown below, it follows that P(a¤) ¡ P(a) <
R a¤
a P0(z)dz, a contradiction.
To show ©(z) < 1, di®erentiate ©(z) and rearrange to get
©0(z) =
¡Q(x¤¤)
2®P(z)2(¹ µ ¡ z)2
"
®P(z)(¹ µ ¡ z)




P0(z)(¹ µ ¡ z) ¡ P(z)
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=
¡Q(x¤¤)
2®P(z)2(¹ µ ¡ z)2
"
P(z)
h ®(¹ µ ¡ z)













(1¡®(¹ µ¡z))2¡¯(¹ µ)+¯(z) =
®(¹ µ¡z)(1¡®(¹ µ¡z)+®2(¹ µ¡z)2)
(1¡®(¹ µ¡z))2 >











2®¯(x)(¹ µ¡x) is routinely shown to decrease in x 2 (0; ¹ µ).22 Since
¹ µ = 2 ¡ wf and µ¤¤ = maxfwf;
2 ¡ wf
2
g = wf (32)
where the last equality is from wf > 0:9, after rearrangement we have
2®¯(0)¹ µ ¡ ¯(x¤¤) + ¯(0) =
2®(1 + 2®2(2 ¡ wf)2wf ¡ ®(8 ¡ 6wf + w2
f))
1 ¡ 2® + ®2(2 ¡ wf)wf
: (33)
It is straightforward calculation [see GC09Aug05.nb] to verify that (33) is positive
for all wf 2 (0:9;1) and all ® 2 (0;1=4), which establishes that ©(x¤) < 1 by (31)
as desired.
Lemma A12: Let x0 = maxfxjga(z) · g¤(z) 8z 2 [a¤;x]g. Then, Ga(x0) >
G¤(x0) and Ga(x¤¤) > 1.
Proof. Note that x0 2 [a¤;x¤¤) by Lemma A11 and that ga(x0) = g¤(x0) by

























1 ¡ ®(¹ µ ¡ x)
>
P0(x)





Thus, Ga(x0) > G¤(x0) must hold. Consequently, Ga(x¤¤) > G¤(x¤¤) = 1 follows
provided that ga(x) ¸ g¤(x) for all x 2 (x0;x¤¤), a condition we verify below.
To reach a contradiction, suppose ga(x) < g¤(x) for some x 2 (x0;x¤¤). Then,










2®(¹ µ¡z)2(1¡2®¹ µ+2®z)2 , the top line
of which can be shown to be negative for all x 2 (0; ¹ µ) given 0 < ¯(x¤¤) < 1.An Economic Theory of Glass Ceiling 44
is y 2 (x0;x¤¤) such that ga(y) = g¤(y) and ga(x) ¸ g¤(x) for all x 2 (x0;y) where
the last inequality is strict for a subset of positive measure of (x0;y). Di®erentiating








Let a0 2 (a;a¤) such that
R x0
a0 ga(z)dz = G¤(x0). Then, G¤ restricted to [a¤;x0]






Q00(y)¯(z)¡P00(y) decreases in z. If y · ^ x, then
R a0






P00(x) > 0 for x · ^ x by (29). Thus, by comparing (37) evaluated for g = ga at x = y
and that evaluated for g = g¤ and a = a¤ at x = y, we deduce that g0
a(y) > g¤0(y),
i.e., ga(x) cuts g¤(x) at x = y from below. Since this would contradict the de¯nition




















Furthermore, since Ga(x0) > G¤(x0) as shown above,
0 < Ga(x0) ¡ G¤(x0) < Ga(y) ¡ G¤(y): (39)
On the other hand, (35) implies





















a¤ ¯(z)g¤(z)dz > 0, the ¯rst equality of (40) would fail due to (38) and (39), given
that y ¸ ^ x as veri¯ed above. Next, if x0 ¸ ^ x, (35) implies that both sides of (38)
are negative. Together with P0(y) < P0(x0) < 0 and 0 · Q0(y) < Q0(x0), this
would contradict the second equality of (40). These contradictions necessitate us
to conclude that ga(x) ¸ g¤(x) for all x 2 (x0;x¤¤), as desired.
Up to now we have characterized the equilibrium outcome and proved the
uniqueness. The properties (i)-(iii) of Theorem 2 follow from the characterization
of the equilibrium outcome, thus completing the proof of Theorem 2.
Proof of Proposition 2: If x · D(µ¤¤), it is evident that the policy does not
have a bite in any part of the proof of Theorem 2 and hence, Theorem 2 holds. If
D(µ¤¤) < x < D(¹ µ), it is lengthy yet straightforward (hence, omitted here) to verifyAn Economic Theory of Glass Ceiling 45
that the proof of Theorem 2 works in the same manner to prove the existence of
the equilibrium with the role of µ¤¤ played by D¡1(x), which proves the claim of
Proposition 2 for this case. If x = D(¹ µ), the maximum possible surplus that a ¯rm
may derive from a woman employee is 0.5 by Lemma 3 and hence, in conjunction
with Lemma 2, either ¯rm's total pro¯t is bounded above by 0.5. Note that either
¯rm can guarantee a pro¯t level no lower than 0.5 by o®ering s¤(¹ µ) and hiring at
least measure 1 of men (which a ¯rm can do according to (H1) or (H2)). Hence, the
equilibrium pro¯t is 0.5 for both ¯rms, which, given x = D(¹ µ), is possible only if
they both o®er a salary of 1:5 for both men and women according to Lemmas 2 and
3. Finally, if x > D(¹ µ) then the payo® of a woman pursuing promotion is at least
u`(x) > 0:5. Note that the equilibrium payo® of a man pursuing promotion cannot
exceed 0.5 for otherwise, given that men's payo® from not pursuing promotion is
0.5, the ¯rm can do better by o®ering a slightly worse contract for men. This proves
the claim of Proposition 2 for the case x > D(¹ µ).
Proof of Proposition 3: Suppose that the said policy is in place with
y 2 [y0;D(¹ µ)] where y0 = D(¹ µ)
1 ¡ 2D(¹ µ)
1 ¡ D(¹ µ)
< D(¹ µ): (41)
Since Lemma 7 still applies, let µi and e µi be the in¯mum and the supremum,
respectively, of the threshold types of the contracts in the support of the equilibrium
contract strategy of ¯rm i = A;B. Without loss of generality, we assume that
µA · µB. If µA = µB < ¹ µ, then at least one ¯rm, say B, does not o®er s¤(µB) with
a positive probability for the same reason as given in the proof of Lemma A2.
If µA < ¹ µ, therefore, ¯rm A is a follower with probability 1 upon o®ering s¤(µA).
Since in this case ¯rm B hires a measure ¹ = 1=(1 ¡ D(µB)) of women by Lemma
3 where µB > µA, the residual female workforce available to A is 2 ¡ 1
1¡D(µB) =
1¡2D(µB)





However, since x(1 ¡ 2x)=(1 ¡ x) increases in x > 0, together with (41), we have
y0 = D(¹ µ)
1 ¡ 2D(¹ µ)








where at least one of the inequalities is strict. Since this would contradict (42), we
have to conclude that µA ¸ ¹ µ and consequently, that µA = µA = ¹ µ. In this case,
o®ering s¤(¹ µ) is optimal for both ¯rms, which completes the proof.
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